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    erformance-based contracting (PBC) is a method   
    of contracting, which is based on the post-  
    construction performance of a building or structure   
    rather than the cost of materials and labour that   
produced it. Payments by the client are therefore spread 
throughout the contract period (beginning on completion) and  
not as interim payments during construction.
PBC represents a simplification of the Private Finance Initiative 
as it separates the physical structure from the financial structures. 
This separation means that negotiations between clients and 
contractors are less time consuming, expensive and complex. 
Because the contract is not directly concerned with the details 
of the building, less paperwork and monitoring of the construction 
work may be required compared to traditional contracting and 
procurement methods.
A number of conclusions are drawn from our research and 
findings. These include: 
•	 	performance-based	contracts	often	involve	engaging	a	
consortium of firms
•	 	the	roles	and	relationships	within	consortia	are	structured	
around risk. The members of consortia share commercial  
and reputational risks but otherwise adopt traditional roles 
within consortia-type arrangements
•	 	the	main	source	of	risk	and	conflict	is	the	reliance	on	other	
members of a consortium to deliver
•	 	long	term	borrowing	in	construction	tends	to	be	lower	than	the	
automotive manufacturing and repairs sector, implying relatively 
less fixed capital investment and longer term commitments. 
This is reinforced by the ratio of fixed assets to capital employed 
and fixed assets as a percentage of turnover
•	 	there	are	many	firms	in	the	construction	industry	whose	 
ratios may well equip them to take on PBC contracts
•	 	the	perceived	risks	of	PBC	deter	most	contractors	from	
considering PBC as an option. However, in a survey, carried 
out as part of this research, 5% of respondents agreed that 
PBC might be used for minor projects only, where the project 
represented only a small percentage of total output of the firm 
and was therefore not a threat to its survival
•	 	PBC	represents	a	service	innovation	if	viewed	as	an	extension	
of the provision of a product. Alternatively it may be viewed  
as the introduction of a new service. 
To provide some context and a relative perspective, we 
compared the construction sector to a manufacturing sector. 
What this revealed was that:
•	 	firms	in	the	construction	industry	tend	to	have	relatively	lower	
capital to output ratios than firms in the automotive industry. 
This implies that firms in construction have little spare 
financial capacity for working capital, long term commitments 
and contingencies. This is reinforced by the net current assets 
to turnover ratio
•	 	the	argument	frequently	given	that	firms	in	construction	
experience relatively low profit margins is not supported by 
the comparison with the automotive industry.
Summary
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Glossary
FFP
Fitness for purpose
FM
Facilities management
IPT
Integrated project team
PBC
Performance-based contracting
PBF
Performance-based fees
PBS
Performance-based specification
PFI
Private finance initiative
PI
Professional indemnity
PSS
Product service systems
SPV
Special purpose vehicle
TPO
Total property outsourcing
TPSP
Traditional public sector provision
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    roblems of the construction industry concerning   
    timely output, quality output and budget reliability in   
    construction projects are repeatedly raised as issues   
    facing the construction industry. The basic idea   
underpinning this report is that if contractors were responsible 
not only for the construction, maintenance and repairs of their 
output but also their performance, then far more attention would 
be given to the longer term post-construction phase of projects 
by contractors. Performance-based contracting (PBC) might offer 
a new approach, which could help to solve the problems. PBC 
occurs in practice already, more or less as standard business 
outside the construction sector, and is widespread within 
specific parts of the construction sector, and may be 
appropriate for wider application, particularly in the public 
sector. With PBC the politics, management and processes  
of construction procurement change. The politics  
of PBC concern the desirability and distribution of benefits  
of procuring buildings using contractors to carry out the 
increased role of owning and operating completed structures. 
Such change implies winners and losers.
If construction contractors are not in a position to undertake 
PBC alone, there may be a need for an intermediary level of 
organisation, such as consortia. Consortia introduce a level  
of management to undertake the complex roles and 
responsibilities involved in PBC. Consortia are often composed 
of organisations that possess construction management skills, 
property development and management skills, and finance.  
The supply chain of specialist contractors and material suppliers 
is often omitted from membership of a consortium. Nevertheless, 
because of increasing componentization, manufacturing firms 
are in a better position to guarantee their elements because:
•	 	supplying	firms	often	have	the	appropriate	capital	structure	
and component cost to total output ratio; and 
•	 	self-contained	and	definable	components,	such	as	doors,	
windows, air-conditioning can be guaranteed as whole 
functioning parts. This also applies to lifts, escalators, etc.
Therefore, installers might be given an ongoing liability to 
maintain their installations, though there may still be the issue 
of payment for the monitoring process. Long term performance 
contracts would mean that buildings may be maintained until 
they become obsolete, when the building becomes more 
expensive to maintain than market rental values would justify. 
Long term contracts would lock both clients and contractors 
into arrangements that might no longer be appropriate when 
market conditions change. Other long term risks involve 
spillover effects, such as the arrival of a new shopping centre 
making existing buildings appear unattractive or unlettable  
or local authority efforts to regenerate an area by improving 
facilities and amenities in a neighbourhood in order to encourage 
developers to invest and refurbish their buildings. These changes 
in a locality may raise a property’s value and require refurbishment 
and maintenance above the maintenance levels agreed in the 
original maintenance contract. PBC may therefore not be as 
flexible	as	other	arrangements	for	maintaining	property,	in	 
the long run.
It may be useful to assume that the key players in construction 
are the main or large contractors, as they are in a position to 
mobilise the plant, labour and materials required. Since they 
have the technical knowledge to undertake the construction 
process, they are also in a position to improve the production 
methods employed. Contractors often argue that they should  
be involved at the early stages of a project, but instead are only 
brought in after much planning and design work has already  
been agreed and decided. It is well known that, once the design 
has been selected and the construction costs estimated, it is 
difficult	for	contractors	to	influence	the	outcome	either	to	
reduce	the	cost	of	construction	or	influence	the	running	and	
maintenance costs of a building.
Traditionally, at least since industrialisation, main contractors 
were taken on only to produce what others selected or 
designed, which may not have been in the best interests of the 
contractor and, by implication, the finished building. Moreover, 
as far as the contractor is concerned it has usually been 
possible for the contractor to pass on to the client any increases 
in costs due to changes in the design or problems in the supply 
chain, not to mention problems further down the line after 
building completion, provided the contractor had satisfied the 
terms of the building contract. Indeed, building contracts have 
evolved this approach to such risks precisely so that contractors 
do not have to charge a premium in order to build up 
contingencies and, in many cases, so that contractors are  
still willing to tender, as contracts that transfer excessive risks  
to contractors may not achieve economical prices for clients.
Although the most economical price may be achieved by 
transferring the risk of increased resource costs to clients, 
public sector clients are often not in a position to take on 
projects without strict spending limits. Therefore, even though it 
may lead to higher prices, public sector projects need to be set 
up	so	that	the	contract	sum	is	not	inflated	during	the	execution	 
of the contract. In other words, it is better in public sector work 
for the contractor to take the risk of changes in market prices of 
labour and materials, i.e. internalise them to the contractor. In 
order to internalise the costs of contracting and the on-going 
costs of inappropriate building methods or building design,  
PFI sought, among other things, to make the contractors and 
funders responsible for costs throughout the building life cycle. 
While this may indeed be the case, the increase in transaction 
costs and the higher costs of finance together with the loss of 
control over the building has only been compensated for by 
possible efficiency gains due to the incentivisation of PFI. 
However it is by no means clear that any improvements in 
efficiency compensate for the increase in risk premium the 
public sector must pay in order for PFI projects to proceed.
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Among other things, PFI combines finance with life-cycle costs  
in an attempt to internalize costs and create incentives for 
innovation and efficiency gains. However, the cost of tendering 
under PFI became prohibitively high to the point where 
contractors began to show increasing reluctance to bid for 
projects. If finance were to be separated from design and 
operational decisions, the result would be PBC, with a focus on 
the performance of buildings and the requirements of the client. 
Under PBC, finance could be procured in the conventional way 
by issuing bonds or by using public sector assets as collateral. 
The financial arrangements actually selected are quite separate 
from (though related to) the operational issues of PBC. Hence, 
finance does not have to be included in PBC. This separation 
would release the teams negotiating contracts from a large 
number of complications and reduce the costs of procurement 
and tendering. With sufficient profit margins in return for 
undertaking PBC, there are distinct possibilities for efficiency 
gains without PFI. In PBC, failure to meet performance 
standards would incur performance penalties. The penalties 
would provide incentives for contractors and operators to meet 
client requirements. The effect would be that buyers would only 
pay for services when they were being satisfactorily provided, 
and would not need to invest in infrastructure.
The key to performance is incentives. Those firms that are first to 
adopt PBC would gain a competitive advantage and expand while 
those that were slower would lose market share. The incentives 
would need to motivate firms and show that they could succeed 
so that others would follow. Because of the lack of contractual 
incentives to improve, little structural change has taken place  
in construction. The question is: why do current contractual 
arrangements not create incentives? There is therefore an 
opportunity to present a new model of contracting that would 
provide incentives and innovation, restructuring of the 
construction market and improvements in productivity.
Performance-based contracting (PBC) may be seen as an 
extension of the conventional building contract. Conventional 
building contracts tend to deal with labour and materials,  
rather than the way a completed facility performs. PBC may  
be referred to as ‘performance-based building’, ‘performance-
based specification’, ‘performance-based serviced building 
acquisition’ or other terms using ‘performance-based’ as a prefix. 
In any event, all of these terms imply that it is the output  
of the building, which is important – not the means by, which it is 
achieved. This approach to contracting is interesting as it is the 
way that most things other than buildings are purchased. 
Indeed, many buildings are already purchased in this way; 
domestic housing, for example, is purchased in terms of its 
value, rather than the labour and material content. The 
emphasis in most discussions that propose and recommend 
PBC is on client or end-user satisfaction (for example, Ang et al., 
2001, Hattis and Becker 2001). A simple way to characterize the 
essence of a performance-based approach is that the focus is 
in what a building does, rather than its inputs.
PBC offers a method of procurement, which may be appropriate 
under certain circumstances. PBC replaces the acquisition of  
an asset with the purchase of a service. It is a form of service-
outsourcing by the client without the need to transfer the 
property asset at the end of the life of a building or at a given 
point in the future. PBC enables firms to buy buildings or 
building components based on reward for performance rather 
than the materials and labour used in the production of the 
component at the construction phase alone. Examples of PBC 
in	the	USA	include	the	provision	of	flat	roofs,	and	in	the	UK	the	
provision of lighting in the University of Bristol for a period of 
time. Some service agreements to install and maintain plumbing 
systems in buildings are also based on a PBC approach. 
This study of PBC is concerned with the costs of tendering and 
procurement and improvements in the actual utility of buildings 
and structures. In contrast performance-based fees (PBF) allow 
savings of efficient design to be shared between the architects/
designers and the clients as part of the contractual 
arrangements per se. 
Since PBC is a method of buying services rather than buildings, 
it allows both private and public sector bodies to pay for the 
provision of a service without investing any capital. In the 
private sector this is commonly used to outsource such things 
as cleaning, catering, advertising, telephone sales and customer 
relations. In the public sector it may be adopted for health care, 
accommodation of students or key members of the labour 
force, provision of public transport, prisons, schools, etc. This 
contrasts with traditional public sector provision (TPSP), where 
the public sector owns and uses buildings to provide health 
care, education and other public services. The public sector 
also leases buildings, such as offices for the civil service, 
government agencies and local authorities.
The demand for buildings is a derived demand, derived from the 
public sector demand for services such as education, health and 
social welfare. Therefore, it is possible to specify the services 
required rather than the buildings themselves. The fundamental 
research question concerns the possibility of conceiving of a 
construction market paradigm that mirrors the way other 
markets operate, such as retail markets for consumer goods. 
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PBC expands the role of contractors, property management 
companies and facilities managers. It may also represent new 
market opportunities for these firms. In order to take advantage 
of the new market openings, it is vital for these firms to 
understand the requirements they would be required to fulfil.  
This study will go part of the way to providing insights into the 
new demands of PBC and the responses these firms will need  
to make to meet them. 
PFI offers an alternative model to the TPSP. In PFI the building  
is procured by the private sector and the services provided 
either by the public sector or the private sector. Examples of  
the former include schools and hospitals. Examples of the latter 
include prisons and infrastructure projects such as the Dartford 
Bridge and the M6 Birmingham bypass. The key point in PFI is 
that at some point the assets are transferred to the public 
sector, and therefore PFI may be construed as a complex 
means of borrowing capital, repaying it by paying for the service 
at the point of delivery.
The differences between the three models of public sector 
provision of mandatory services are summarized in Table 1. In 
TPSP, government retains ownership, control and management 
of the assets. In PFI, the assets are built and financed by the 
private sector (often with the help of payments in kind such as 
land or buildings already in the public sector) and eventually  
the new assets are transferred to the public sector. In PBC, as 
pointed out above, the assets are not necessarily transferred to 
the public sector. The ultimate risk of failure in the provision of 
the service in all three systems is carried by the public sector, 
although in PFI and PBC private sector firms are exposed to 
losses and the risk of bankruptcy.
Introduction
Table 1: Features of traditional public sector provision, Private Finance Initiative and Performance-based Contracting
Role of public sector
Provider of services
Ownership of assets
Value of assets
Finance for capital  
expenditure 
Benefits
Disadvantages
Spillover effects
Public sector is 
provider and client
Public sector employees
Owned by public sector
Gains held by the public sector
Public sector finance 
Gains returned to public sector. 
Ownership and control over  
national assets
Unresponsive service provision
Political interests intervene directly 
on behalf of third parties especially 
when unforeseen events arise
Traditional public sector provisions
Public sector is joint 
provider and client
Public and or private 
sector employees
Temporarily owned but later 
transferred to public sector (land 
tends to remain a public sector 
asset throughout) 
Gains shared by both public and 
private sector
Private sector finance under public 
sector approval
Combines capital and revenue 
concerns in the building
Combines capital and revenue 
concerns in the building
Not the concern of the  
private funders and operators 
beyond legal and contractual 
requirements
Private finance initiative
Public sector is client
Private sector employees
Owned by private sector, not 
necessarily transferred to the 
public sector.
Gains held by the private sector
Private sector finance
Client can focus on delivery and 
service allowing management  
to respond
Client can focus on delivery and 
service allowing management  
to respond
Not the concern of the  
private funders and operators 
beyond legal and contractual 
requirements
Performance-based contracting
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Figures	1,	2	and	3	illustrate	the	monetary	flows	(solid	lines)	from	
government and the private sector into assets and the provision  
of services, as well as the respective monetary gains. In Figures 2 
and 3 the short arrow from government to the private sector 
represents revenue payments by government for services 
rendered. It does not represent any payments for capital 
investment since this is carried out wholly within the private 
sector in PFI and PBC projects. The broken lines represent 
non-monetary gains. In TPSP, any monetary gains are retained 
by the public sector, but there are also non-monetary gains, 
which consist of hidden subsidies to the private sector, such as 
low, subsidized fares on public transport that do not cover the 
cost of the provision, such as bus fares on designated routes.
Similar non-monetary gains may also arise in PFI projects. 
However, in PFI the monetary gains are shared (not necessarily 
equally) by both the public and the private sectors. In PBC the 
monetary gains are retained by the private sector though the 
public sector still receives indirect gains through taxation on 
income and profits, where these are declared in the host 
country. In buying the privately produced services, the public 
sector may also gain an equivalent of consumer surplus, based 
on value for money. PBC may also have implications regarding 
economies of management and different forms of accountability.
The point at which a preferred bidder is selected is known as the 
financial close. On reaching the financial close the private sector, 
often in the form of a consortium of firms, moves from an informal 
arrangement to forming a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). In Figure 
1 the project is only concerned with the procurement of a building 
or structure. In Figure 2 the consortium is engaged to provide 
on-going services through an operating company. This takes the 
form of a project management company to, which the operating 
contract is transferred. In Figure 3 under PBC the role of the 
private sector is further extended to provide the assets and  
the service provision.
PBC begins by identifying the performance that is required by 
the client from a constructed facility. The contractor’s reward  
is then tied to the extent that this performance is achieved. 
Building contractors negotiate directly on their ability to meet 
performance targets. The focus of the negotiation thus moves 
from a traditional supplier-led focus to a discussion of customer 
and user requirements. As well as a series of successful 
implementations in the USA, a number of modern procurement 
methods in the UK, e.g. Procure 21, Prime Contracting, involve 
these principles to varying degrees. Moreover, some European 
states routinely procure buildings on a functional basis, rather 
than the cost of the builders’ work and materials. 
Gains
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Assets
Provision
of services
Gains
Government
Private
Assets
Provision
of services
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Government
Private
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Apart from PBC of whole buildings, facilities and services,  
there are a number of issues concerning planning and the 
organization and management of sub-systems in buildings.  
PBC may also be seen as a response to the calls by Achieving 
Excellence and nCRISP to discuss the need to adopt 
performance principles. From a research point of view this  
study may be seen as a speculative discussion about changing 
conditions in the property market-place brought about by 
developments in public procurement policies and technological 
developments. As such, this research could also be used to 
inform public sector procurement policies. Indeed, in view of 
changing current economic conditions, it might be argued that 
where PBC is used to simply provide services off-balance  
sheet, such practices might no longer be attractive to lenders.
1.1 Public sector procurement and the construction sector
As PBC is concerned with more than the delivery of a building or a 
structure, the range of skills, technologies, management strategies 
and business models that are required call for the use of additional 
combinations of firms to supply the full needs of the client. One 
response on the part of the supply side has been the adoption of 
supply chains and a focus on their management. Another has 
been the use of construction consortia which combine finance, 
construction management skills and facilities management 
services. Construction procurement by the public sector has 
long been seen as problematic. For example, one recent report 
published by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) 
expressed concern over traditional approaches to procurement 
by local authorities. According to this report (2003: p12), the 
traditional interface between clients and contractors and the 
management of contracts often causes problems, which 
constrain innovation and inhibit the use of external suppliers. 
Firms may often form consortia to provide large and complex 
public sector projects. These appear to be relatively efficient 
and effective. Hence, once a public sector client has decided 
that a major project is needed, it will often engage a consortium 
with sufficient financial backing and technical expertise in 
construction to carry out the work.
From the client’s point of view the use of a consortium implies 
that a team could be employed, which would work together to 
solve problems, reduce costs and lower risks. At the same time, 
quality issues could be addressed. By forming a consortium it is 
intended to achieve these objectives in a shorter period than 
with traditional design, tendering and contracting methods, 
assuming firms collaborated at an early stage. Moreover, not 
only could the consortium carry out the building work, the same 
arrangement could be used to deliver services, including 
facilities management, after the construction phase.
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) are invariably set up to structure 
the delivery once a contract has been agreed. Before a contract 
can be agreed, informal consortia are formed, combining banking, 
property and construction companies. Only when one of these 
informal consortia wins a bid is an SPV formally established. 
Several methods of public procurement have emerged under the 
umbrella of the PFI, including Prime Contracting for MoD projects, 
and Framework Agreements for schools and other types of 
building, and Procure 21 for NHS projects.
These initiatives invariably involve organizational structures 
that require a supply chain. For example, in Prime Contracting 
there are clusters of firms supplying the cluster group leader 
or Prime Contractor. Each of the clusters has clusters of other 
firms supplying their specialist construction requirements. 
Under Procure 21, Primary Supply Chain Partnerships (PSCPs) 
have been set up. These PSCPs are construction consortia, 
which have prequalified for NHS projects. However, Proverbs 
and Riley (2003) raise the issue of the extent to which the use 
of supply chains and clusters are formal rather than effective 
structures. In a case study of Procure 21 carried out by 
Proverbs and Riley (ibid.), they found little awareness among 
NHS Trust staff of the supply chain companies and, although 
NHS Estates advertised Procure 21 widely, individual members 
of staff were not generally prepared for the new system of 
procurement when it was launched.
The use of consortia in construction does not necessarily  
mean that construction firms could not work together outside 
consortia. In construction there has always been co-operation 
and a problem-solving ethos; otherwise buildings could never 
have been built. Nevertheless, the management of risk may be 
one factor leading to the formation of consortia. It might be 
argued that one of the main reasons for the formation of a 
consortium is because it is not possible to parcel up risks.  
The members of a consortium are forced into the position of 
trusting others to make commercial decisions on their behalf, 
which they are going to be held to, because in principle,  
though not necessarily, they are all jointly and severally liable.  
In practice, ultimately, the client or individual parties carry the 
risks at present. PBC may enable clients to reduce some of  
their risk associated with construction and facilities 
management by transferring it to contractors instead.
Introduction
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1.2 Objectives of the report
The objectives of this study are to:
•	 	identify	the	contractual	basis	of	the	performance	concept	 
in building projects
•	 	devise	techniques	for	measuring	the	impact	of	different	
procurement methods
•	 learn	how	various	approaches	to	PBC	achieve	their	aims
•	 	identify	the	extent	to	which	sustainability	needs	could	be	
achieved using the principles of PBC
•	 	identify	and	disseminate	how	the	principles	of	PBC	could	 
best be taken advantage of.
As main or large contractors are in a position to mobilize plant, 
labour and materials and, as they have the technical knowledge 
to undertake the construction process, it is apparent they are  
in a position to improve the production methods employed. 
Although contractors tend to prefer early involvement in 
projects, in many cases this does not occur. Once a design  
has been selected and the construction costs estimated, it is 
difficult	for	contractors	to	influence	the	outcome	to	reduce	the	
cost	of	construction	or	influence	the	running	and	maintenance	
costs of a building.
Traditionally contractors have been taken on only to produce 
what others have selected, which may not always be in the best 
interests of the contractor and, by implication, the finished 
building. Moreover, as far as contractors are concerned it has 
always been possible for them to externalize any increases in 
costs due to changes in design or problems in the supply chain, 
not to mention problems further down the line after building 
completion, provided the contractor has satisfied the strict 
terms of the building contract.
One aim of PFI has been to externalize the costs to the client  
of contracting and the on-going costs of inappropriate building 
methods or building design. In PFI projects the public sector 
clients aim, as far as possible, to make the contractors and 
funders responsible for costs throughout the building life cycle. 
This has been done with a view to ensuring adherence to 
budget in public sector projects. The increase in transaction 
costs associated with PFI and the higher costs of finance were 
expected to be compensated for by possible efficiency gains 
due to the incentivization of PFI. However it is by no means 
clear that any improvements in efficiency compensate for the 
increase in risk premium the public sector must pay the private 
sector in order for PFI projects to proceed.
By combining finance with life-cycle costs in an attempt to 
internalize costs and create incentives for innovation and 
efficiency gains, the approach to tendering for PFI projects 
increased the cost of tendering considerably, to the point where 
contractors have begun to show increasing reluctance to bid for 
projects. For this reason, PBC may offer a solution to the high 
cost of delay caused by protracted negotiations between the 
public sector and the private sector by separating the 
discussion of finance from the performance of buildings and the 
requirements of the client. Public finance could be procured in 
the conventional way by issuing bonds and paying for service 
through the public sector revenue account. This would release 
the teams negotiating contracts from a large number of 
complications and reduce the costs of procurement and 
tendering. Naturally risks would still need to be identified and 
measured. Incentives would be provided by performance 
penalties even if projects were financed by government. Finance 
does not necessarily have to be included in PBC negotiations 
between the supplier and the client. There would still be distinct 
possibilities for efficiency gains without PFI.
The key to performance is incentivization. If those firms that  
first adopt PBC gain a competitive advantage and expand they 
would gain market share at the expense of those that were 
slower to adapt. Firms require incentives to attract them to new 
methods of working and demonstrate success, which others 
might then follow. However, in construction, firms have relatively 
few incentives or opportunities to innovate. For example,  
current contractual arrangements do not appear to create such 
incentives. It is therefore possible that PBC may provide an 
opportunity to present a new model of contracting that would 
provide incentives and innovation, leading to a restructuring of 
the construction market and improvements in productivity.
Much innovation in the construction industry is driven by the 
client. The public sector client, acting as a model client, may be 
in a position to create the conditions and terms necessary for 
contractors to respond by offering PBC. In PBC there is a need 
to specify performance levels and desirable outcomes. The 
client would need to give contractors and suppliers a clearly 
defined project, stating broad outcomes. For example, if the 
project were a school, which is a well defined use, the number 
of pupils to be housed with a specific list of functional facilities 
such as dining room, kitchen, library, gym, staff rooms and 
toilets form broad outcomes together with environmental and 
energy use performance specifications.
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Contracting firms would then compete to provide the school, 
and quality would be driven by the contractors’ need to protect 
their reputation and maintain good relations with their clients as 
well as their desire for repeat business. In this way PBC could 
be one method used by contractors to compete for market 
share and pursue growth policies.
In Germany, Hochtief offers clients solutions and costs and  
then offers to carry out projects but transaction costs remain 
relatively high. Using this PBC model, contractors demonstrate 
to the client how to obtain better value out of projects. One 
major constraint is EU competition law, which may have done 
much to prevent or limit abuses but at the cost of innovative 
procurement methods.
1.3 Literature review
Innovation in services
We begin the literature review by presenting a theoretical 
framework for innovation in general. We then review the 
literature on PBC in terms of its innovative properties.
The output of contractors consists of buildings and civil 
engineering structures and work on existing built stock. It might 
therefore be argued that contractors produce tangible products. 
However, it could also be argued that they move on to a site and 
assemble a number of different materials on behalf of their 
clients, the developers. It is the developers, who own the site 
and, because of interim payments, own the buildings under 
construction. The contractors merely provide building services, 
organizing the labour processes, hiring plant and equipment, 
and managing the materials and components on behalf of their 
clients. The contractors use their knowledge, experience and 
business contacts to provide a service to developers and 
building owners.
The dichotomy between product and service is being eroded, 
because PFI projects increase awareness of the life cycle 
implications of construction projects. Product Service Systems 
(PSS) in many sectors of the economy are being adopted to 
focus suppliers on the requirements and needs of customers 
with a view to improving the service to be provided. This 
after-sales service can include maintenance, repair and 
replacement of products and is offered in industries ranging  
from automobiles to lighting and facilities management.
PBC is an example, as is PFI, of innovation in construction 
services, where previously attention has focused almost 
exclusively on delivering a built structure. This innovative thinking 
can be seen in the context of economic theory concerned with 
services. In his analysis of the economics of service provision, 
Galouj (2002: p1) points to three approaches, which can be 
characterized as a technologist approach, a service-oriented 
approach and an integrative approach. The first relies on 
technology for innovation, the second on organization, and  
the third on convergence between goods and services. This last 
approach can be seen to account for the kind of innovation in 
the construction industry discussed in this report.
These three areas of innovation can be viewed in the context of 
different kinds of production-intensive firm identified by Pavitt 
(1984). First, innovation can take place in scale-intensive firms, 
which are engaged in mass production; second, specialized 
suppliers, such as mechanical engineering; third, science-based 
firms, such as electronics and chemical industries and supplier-
dominated firms such as traditional manufacturing, agriculture 
and construction.
Of particular relevance here is Pavitt’s description of supplier-
dominated firms, which tend to be small in terms of numbers 
employed and have no systematic approach to research and 
development. They also tend to have difficulty adopting 
innovative technology based approaches, which forces these 
firms to rely on alternatives such as marketing. Their clients tend 
to be concerned with price more than performance, which leads 
the firms in this category to be focused on cost cutting. 
Although Pavitt’s description is a generalization across a 
number of industries, it does appear to fit a description of firms 
in construction. However, Galouj points out that firms are far 
more heterogeneous than implied in Pavitt’s description and 
later writers have expanded on Pavitt’s work. For example, 
Soete and Miozzo (1990) add to Pavitt’s taxonomy by 
describing service firms that are dominated by their suppliers  
of technical systems, firms that rely on networks of transport  
or information, and specialist firms that are science-based and 
innovative. Examples of all these types of service firm can be 
found in construction.
Barras (1986) suggests a theory of innovation, which passes 
through three phases. The first phase occurs as innovations in 
the process improve efficiency. The second phase is when these 
processes are used to improve quality of the service, and the 
third phase is the introduction of new services. Barras (1990) 
applies these phases to the banking sector. Using a similar 
approach, similar changes can be seen in construction. In 
construction, prefabrication and standardization may be viewed 
in terms of an efficiency improvement phase, whereas PBC may 
be seen as the introduction of new services made viable by the 
new technologies such as IT and communications and the 
resulting ability to integrate the production and service 
processes involved in the provision of a built structure.  
Although it is sometimes difficult to define the phases in 
construction, PBC clearly fits phase 3 in terms of offering a  
new service. Galouj points out that innovation in services is  
not the technological change itself but rather the changes in  
the service, which the technology permits as firms learn, adapt 
and adopt the new possibilities made available.
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This discussion establishes a three dimensional framework,  
in, which innovative economic activities occur. These dimensions 
are production intensity, innovation path and phase of 
innovation. Each economic activity, V, thus comprises three 
elements. The first concerns production, P, the second is 
servuction, S, (used to distinguish service production from 
product production) and the third is the organization of the  
firm	in	its	business	environment.	Belleflamme,	et al., (1986) 
summarize this as an equation:
V = bP + cS + I
The coefficients b and c represent the relative importance of 
production and servuction in the activity. If b>c then the activity 
is concentrated on providing a good. If c>b then the activity  
is largely concerned with providing a service. According to 
Belleflamme,	et al., this formulation can be used to identify a 
new service or good, a new or improved process of production 
or a new or improved process of servuction or combination of 
all three changes.
This can be seen as a framework for identifying the place of PBC 
in the construction production/servuction process. Perception 
is also important. PBC may be seen as an extension of the 
provision of a product or may be viewed as the introduction of 
a new service. This distinction is difficult to define. As Gallouj 
(2002: 40) points out, “If the protagonists believe that the 
product they are paying for and from, which they are benefiting  
is the immediate act of service delivery, the process and product 
are virtually one and the same thing.” He therefore suggests that a 
new service function based on existing processes is considered 
to be a product innovation. An existing service function drawing 
on new systems is generally a process innovation. If a 
completely new service and process is introduced it may be 
regarded as product innovation, which would not necessarily 
give full recognition to service innovation.
Gallouj (2002: 45) defines quasi-goods as devices or capacities 
placed at the user’s disposal, such as automatic cash 
dispensers, train ticket machines and information points. Car 
rentals and leasing arrangements would also come under the 
definition of quasi-goods. However, though different in scale a 
building or structure may be seen as a quasi-good placed at  
the disposal of the building users or those wishing to cross a 
bridge. As Gallouj points out the only difference between 
quasi-goods and traditional goods is their ownership and mode 
of use by the recipient. A traditional manufactured good is 
consumed individually while quasi-goods are used collectively.
Applying	the	equation	from	Belleflamme	et al., above, services, 
such as PBC, may be perceived as a set of characteristics 
comprising goods and services. These characteristics may  
be defined in terms of human requirements. For example, it may 
be specified that a building might provide adequate ventilation, 
light and sound insulation, warmth and security. A service 
innovation may involve the addition of a new characteristic such 
as entertainment, aesthetics, food and drink provision. Other 
specifications	might	include	improved	traffic	flow	within	a	
building, improved rest areas and wash-room facilities, 
compared to existing facilities.
A further aspect of service innovation involves the participation 
of the client or recipient. Yet providing a service requires the 
co-operation of the client and indeed the recipient must have 
certain competencies in order to participate. Although the 
theory proposed by Gadrey and Gallouj (1998) is applied more 
generally to business and the professions, this aspect is 
particularly relevant to the interface between the supplier of 
building facilities and the building tenants and users, where both 
tenants and users must be able to specify their needs and use 
the building appropriately.
Servicing these specifications can only be accomplished by 
providing appropriate buildings or building components. As 
Gallouj (2002: 65) points out “goods produce lasting effects, 
which are services”. As buildings tend to be one of the more 
long lasting durables produced, their lasting effects have the 
potential to provide more services than goods produced in  
other sectors.
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Gallouj (2002: 71) identifies six linked and overlapping models  
of innovation – radical, which creates new characteristics; 
ameliorative, which improves the quality of characteristics; 
incremental, which adds or subtracts characteristics; ad hoc, 
which produces new competencies in individuals often 
transferring back into technical characteristics of the service; 
recombinative, which combines or separates groups of service 
characteristics; and, objectifying innovation, which standardizes 
service characteristics. Each of these models of innovation  
can be viewed in terms of PBC, as follows:
•	 	first,	PBC	represents	radical	innovation	in	so	far	as	new	
competencies are brought into existence that do not occur  
in traditional contracting. Here we might include PFI projects, 
where contractors are held responsible for the delivery of a 
building over a long period of time after completion. 
•	 	PBC	might	also	be	said	to	come	under	ameliorative	innovation	
as it does not change the structure of the system but only 
alters the weight or importance of certain service 
characteristics. Again there are elements of incremental 
innovation as PBC involves both the addition of characteristics 
such as guaranteed services and usability, and the removal  
of others such as paper work and accountability for the 
materials and labour used. 
•	 	as	ad	hoc	innovation	often	involves	the	interface	between	 
the service provider and the client, this form of innovation is 
relevant where projects are large and the client is a powerful 
agent such as a government department or public sector 
body. This may occur over the life of the building as 
requirements are altered to meet changing circumstances. 
•	 	recombinative	innovation	is	also	involved	with	PBC	as	 
the bundles of characteristics being combined are the 
characteristics of construction services and the 
characteristics of facilities management.
•	 	objectifying	or	formalization	innovation,	is	also	applicable	to	
PBC as this involves standardizing service characteristics, 
through specification of requirements and the creation of 
technical criteria. One aspect of formalization is the naming of 
the service, for example, PBC, Supply Chain Management and 
Partnering, and then establishing principles by, which the service 
might be defined. In many cases these models of innovation 
are responsive to changes in the business environment.
•	 	the	evolutionary	theory	of	innovation	sees	innovation	as	a	
problem solving activity, providing new services to meet new 
or changing circumstances, which may be technical, social, 
political and organizational. Significant changes in technology 
and the built environment may be altering the way buildings 
need to be procured. The increased requirements of clients 
and the increased complexity of buildings may mean that it is 
no longer sufficient for firms employing relatively untrained 
staff to undertake relatively complicated roles and activities. 
The cost and time needed to acquire the knowledge 
necessary to design to the level demanded may be beyond 
the client’s limits. Clients may know what they need without 
necessarily knowing how to achieve it.
This is common in many markets. The automotive, electronics 
and pharmaceuticals industries all supply goods and services, 
which are beyond the understanding of their customers and 
users. Nevertheless, markets for the outputs of these industries 
function efficiently to a greater or lesser extent. They clearly 
provide customer satisfaction as measured by the repeat 
business undertaken, at the same time generating sufficient 
returns on capital employed and satisfactory shareholder value. 
They achieve this by a continuous process of innovation.
Performance-based contracting
PBC is based on function rather than the provision of the built 
asset alone. For example, performance-based fees (PBF) allow 
savings of efficient design to be shared between the architects/
designers and the clients as part of the contractual arrangements. 
Straub (2007) gives examples of performance measures in 
social housing in the Netherlands. These performance criteria 
include: jammed windows and doors, cracking paint and loss of 
gloss paint. According to Straub, the advantages of performance-
based contracting based on such criteria include improved 
performance, direct and indirect savings, efficient risk allocation 
and reduced paperwork. Checket-Hanks (2008) gives the 
increasing cost of energy as a further reason for the interest in 
adopting PBC for heating and ventilating systems in the USA.
Of course the use of PBC in the public sector extends beyond 
construction. Boykin (2005) discusses PBC in general across 
different US government departments. Most Federal government 
departments and agencies were actively encouraged to adopt 
PBC by the setting of targets for PBC as a percentage of public 
sector procurement. This followed the Government Performance 
and Results Act of 1993, which set “program goals, measuring 
program performance against those goals” (Office of 
Management and Budget, 1993). These goals were also linked 
to departmental strategic plans and Congressional budgets. 
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However, Kimbler and Rutherford (1993) identified a number of 
issues regarding outsourcing of service providers including late 
delivery, non-delivery of promises and reworking, which was 
often required. Nevertheless, they found that corporate real 
estate outsourcing (including facilities management) was 
increasing in the USA. Similarly, in their survey of property-
related management functions in Europe and North America, 
Bon and Luck (1999) found that out of the four services of 
design management, construction management, facilities 
management and maintenance management, only construction 
management shifted towards in-house management between 
1993 and 1998. Outsourcing to carry out activities not seen  
as central by management to the specialist skills, services or 
products offered by firms appears to be on a rising trend.
Manning, Rodriguez and Roulac (1997) point to the potential 
benefits of outsourcing of real estate functions, including 
efficiency gains from economies of scale and scope. However, 
they point out that although a reduction in transaction costs in 
outsourcing routine tasks is possible, a premium transaction 
cost may be paid compared to in-house management to carry 
out the same tasks. Nevertheless, they, too, conclude that firms 
have increasingly and successfully outsourced some of their real 
estate responsibilities, but they point to the need to monitor the 
cost effectiveness of the transactions involved.
Applying similar methods in the context of the public sector, 
namely outsourcing routine tasks, could release funds in the short 
term for service provision. Using PBC, government departments 
could then concentrate on their core functions and outsource 
their fixed and current assets. PBC in the public sector could be 
used to extend the concept of outsourcing by including all labour 
inputs, buildings and their maintenance. However, there remain a 
number of practical difficulties. For example, some doubts have 
recently been expressed concerning outsourced hospital cleaning 
services. In the private sector outsourcing has usually been 
restricted to the out-tasking of low-level services such as 
cleaning, security, catering and reprographics.
Outsourcing can reduce costs if the contractor can take 
advantage of economies of scale and has greater bargaining 
strength in its own purchasing markets. This also takes 
advantage of the knowledge, experience and skills of the 
contractor, though some of the skills and experience of the 
client may be lost in the process as outside agencies take over 
certain functions. Nevertheless, outsourcing may offer benefits 
for firms and organizations but in order to take systematic 
decisions and monitor their effectiveness, according to 
Christensen (2001), three factors are important – a specifiable 
function, measurable activities and measurable risks.
One issue raised by Gibson and Louargand (2001) is that 
outsourcing the property portfolio creates a separation of 
property asset management from the management and strategic 
planning of the firm or organization. This means that the ability  
to exploit the property market is impaired and the ability to 
co-ordinate property requirements with the organization’s own 
plans is reduced. Total property outsourcing (TPO) is concerned 
with facilities management, (FM), property asset management 
and property finance. Gibson and Louargand list the functions 
associated with FM, including security, cleaning, maintenance, 
reprographics and catering, often carried out by divisions within 
large construction firms. Asset management includes lease 
management, acquisitions, disposals, and redevelopment,  
often carried out by real estate consultancies. Funding includes 
freehold, leasehold, licences and joint ventures. Outsourcing  
can involve any or all of these functions. 
Using different criteria, buildings can be subdivided in a number 
of different ways. Gibson and Louargand (ibid.) argue that 
property can be analysed using three criteria. These are the type 
of asset, the type of use to which the building is put and the 
type of environmental context of the property. “These categories 
have been selected because they relate in some way to 
outsourcing decisions” (Gibson and Louargand, 2001:47, italics 
inserted). However, Gibson and Louargand do not say how they 
relate to the outsourcing decision. Nevertheless, we build upon 
their work.
In more detail they define type of assets as strategic, special  
or generic. Strategic assets might be R & D facilities; special 
facilities could be wind farms or theatres, and generic types 
include offices, distribution and retail buildings. They describe 
the use of buildings as core, cyclical and casual assets. Core 
buildings are central to the functioning of the firm or organization, 
such as head offices. Cyclical buildings are those required in 
response to changes in demand for the services of the 
organization. Casual buildings are those only required on an  
ad hoc basis.
Gibson and Louargand (ibid.) see the property market in terms 
of varying degrees of risk for the property owning firm. Their 
framework or checklist can be used to identify and analyse risk 
exposure and the extent of the need for outsourcing different 
property requirements. They argue that “a key reason for 
outsourcing is to transfer risks to a third party that can manage 
the risks more effectively,” (Gibson and Louargand, 2001:50). It 
follows that there is a need to determine which aspects of the 
workplace to outsource and the nature of the implied 
contractual arrangement.
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As PBC involves the purchase of services rather than a specific 
building, it transfers certain risks to the provider. Nevertheless, 
the client is still exposed to a number of risks, many of them as a 
result of PBC. The total risk to the client may even increase, but 
one of the reasons, and one of the incentives for the client to 
adopt PBC, is to reduce risk for the purchaser. The problem of 
risk then shifts to the suppliers and this increase in risk to the 
suppliers may be greater than the risk they are willing to accept.
The risks to the client are that even a small default by the 
provider may cost the client a disproportionately large sum, 
which could not or would not be reimbursed by the provider. 
The client no longer has direct control over the building or the 
services that a monopolist provider supplies. The costs of 
substitution would inhibit the client to the benefit of the  
provider. Future changes in requirements would depend on  
the negotiating skills of managers but be dependent on the 
monopolist supplier’s willingness to comply. A further risk is  
that the business failure of the supplier would not lead to 
compensation of the client whose services would still be 
required by the building users.
The shift in procurement method to PBC gives ongoing control 
to the service provider. The client no longer has direct access  
to the detailed management of the service being provided.  
In public sector projects, the motives of the two parties – the 
public sector client and the private sector service supplier – are 
different. The aim of the client is to see that quality of service is 
maintained while the aim of the provider is to generate profits.  
The purpose of a public sector client is to provide public 
services whereas firms in the private sector aim to increase 
shareholder value. These aims are not always compatible.  
On the other hand, they are not necessarily incompatible.
In projects involving the provision of a building, the private sector 
is represented by construction contractors, who provide a 
service	on	the	developer’s	land	using	cash	flow	to	manage	the	
building production process. As such, contractors are not willing 
(or able) to take on any residual risk after the term of a contract 
expires, the public sector conventionally assumes responsibility 
for the building at the end of the contract period. This reversion 
of the asset does not necessarily complicate the transaction.  
The purchase of buildings is not necessarily any more problematic 
or complicated in principle than in the housing market where 
purchasers buy houses with the minimum of inspection.
Because the public sector is mandated to provide services, 
there can be no failure due to a supplier being unable to 
function. For example school buildings have to be safe and 
weatherproof regardless of the financial problems facing a 
contractor. If building failure of a school occurs, portakabins 
may be used as schoolrooms. Until a solution of this nature is 
found, the school is out of use, and the providing authority is 
failing in its function – a situation that cannot last for long.
PBC	may	be	a	flexible	form	of	procurement.	Nevertheless,	it	
could be argued that PBC is no different from conventional 
outsourcing. Indeed, many buildings are procured speculatively 
by developers who act as a form of outsourcing as far as their 
tenants are concerned. According to data referring to type of 
work in Construction Statistics Annual (ONS 2009) we estimate 
that 64% of private new work and 48% of all new work is 
speculative building, built without necessarily having a specific 
tenant or purchaser, and with a view to selling the capital asset 
at some point in the future. These percentages are based on the 
provisional figures for the proportion of private housing, offices, 
shops and warehouses as a proportion of total new building in 
2008. However, not all new-build offices, etc, are necessarily 
speculative. Very approximately, at least half, i.e. the majority,  
of all new work is not speculative. Thus PBC may be a useful 
option, where buildings are built for use rather than speculatively.
Although these estimates assume public sector new work is not 
speculative, it is invariably outsourced. The Government’s Civil 
Estates use various forms of outsourcing of buildings and 
services. PBC has already started.
Total property out-sourcing
TPO focuses on the provision of buildings, especially their 
elements such as air conditioning, lighting, lifts etc., and the 
facilities management on a day-to-day basis. There are three 
levels of outsourcing in terms of increasing value added 
activities: out-tasking, outsourcing and strategic outsourcing. 
The questions raised by total property outsourcing involve the 
following issues:
•	Who	should	own	the	assets?
•	Why	might	a	firm	outsource	its	workplaces?
•	How	can	an	organization	assess	the	risks	involved?
In principle, PFI enables public sector funds to be used to 
deliver services rather than create assets. It takes advantage of 
the fact that private sector firms have access to a wider range  
of funding than that available to the public sector though, of 
course, the financial crisis of 2008 and its consequences have 
highlighted the fact that financial market conditions can vary like 
any other market. The public sector may pay rents for the use of 
the buildings or the public may pay tolls directly for the use of 
roads or other public sector provided facilities.
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If the fixed assets are no longer in the public sector, this would 
release funds for revenue spending for service provision. 
Government departments could then concentrate on their core 
functions and outsource their fixed assets. Private sector 
outsourcing has been restricted to the out-tasking of low level 
services such as cleaning, security, catering and reprographics, 
though the use of management consultants and PFI has 
extended the list of tasks.
PBC is a form of outsourcing. Outsourcing takes advantage  
of the knowledge of contractors using their organizational skills 
and experience to provide a broader range of services than  
they have traditionally undertaken. This could in turn lead to 
innovation in the way buildings are procured, built and managed 
and therefore add value to the process of service delivery.
There are, however, three areas of risk associated with property 
management. These risks relate to financial issues, the property 
market and business management. The financial risk is 
concerned with the timing of purchases and sale of properties. 
From the public sector point of view it is a question of managing 
publicly owned assets in the public interest, taking market 
conditions into account. For private sector firms, these financial 
risks are also pertinent, because they continually need to take 
into account their balance sheet position. Similar financial risks 
apply when renting or leasing properties when prices are 
relatively high, which may mean higher costs but this may be 
one method of managing possibly avoidable or postponable 
costs. Property market risks include the deterioration of a 
locality and its effect on property values. Business risks include 
inflexibility	in	the	buildings,	which	impair	the	efficient	operation	
of the organization. This is particularly the case when long 
contracts are entered into by the public sector. Uncertainty 
regarding the very long run may lead to ownership rather than 
outsourcing of property.
Although most TPO deals take more than a year to complete and 
implement, TPO may be attractive to decision makers. Gibson 
and Louargand (ibid.) point out that strategic outsourcing may 
be	driven	by	factors	that	influence	the	environment	that	the	
firm operates in, such as the growth of e-commerce and/or 
corporate factors, such as a firm’s changing property 
requirements. The decision to outsource may be the result of a 
number of business imperatives, including reducing the gearing 
ratio, raising cash and reducing the exposure to risk. Firms may 
outsource because they have insufficient cash or capital, or  
they may lack property expertise. They may have an 
outsourcing champion within the firm, who is a strong advocate 
for the strategy. Other reasons for outsourcing property may be 
the perceived relationship between the property portfolio and 
the organization’s core activities or the ratio of annual property 
costs to total running costs, where this ratio is high. As part of a 
restructuring of an organization, one strategy open to decision 
makers is outsourcing.
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Difficulties in outsourcing property, and therefore obstacles to 
PBC from the point of view of the client, include the fact that 
different departments may be responsible for different aspects 
of the property function. Asset management may be located in  
a finance department while facilities management is organized 
separately. This leads to a number of difficulties in costing, 
pricing and managing outsourcing decisions. The outsourcing 
contracts may be complex and difficult to negotiate and 
outsourcing may be seen as a threat by the property managers 
within a firm or organization. 
As	assets,	buildings	vary	in	their	specificity	and	flexibility	of	use.	
Some may be special buildings such as hospitals or theatres, 
while others are generic, such as offices and dwellings. The 
characteristics of these niche property markets involve varying 
degrees of risk for the property owning firm. Based on the type 
of built asset, if it has a specific use, or a strategic use as part 
of a corporate plan, or are general in nature. Gibson, V., and  
M. Louargand, (2001) suggest that these criteria can be used 
to identify and analyse risk exposure and the extent of the need 
for outsourcing property requirements.
TPO is concerned with property from the point of view of the 
developer or property owner. The question raised here concerns 
extending the role of the building contractor and this involves 
procuring an ongoing service provided by the contractor to 
incentivize the contractor in a project with a view to encouraging 
the contractor to consider the longer term issues of a completed 
building’s use. This may well involve altering the conventional 
role not only of the building contractor but also of the developer, 
whose role has been to procure finance and act as a catalyst, 
bringing the stakeholders together and creating a built structure 
as an end result. As noted earlier, for service innovation to take 
place the client also has to be fully engaged in the process. 
If particular building contractors do not have the financial 
structure to support this kind of provision, there may nevertheless 
be various aspects, i.e. sub-systems, of the provision of a building 
that may be outsourced effectively and efficiently. PBC at the 
sub-component level of construction involves specifying  
what components are required to do and the most efficient 
means of achieving it. One way of providing suppliers, whether 
manufacturers, specialist contractors or main contractors,  
with the appropriate commercial focus is for them to remain 
responsible for performance of their components after installation 
is complete. There are therefore three elements to PBC: 
•	 the	specifying	of	output
•	 	the	controlling	of	costs	and	paying	suppliers,	during	 
and after construction; and 
•	 the	maintenance	of	service	level.
With PBC, the contractor may undertake to maintain the 
component until it is replaced, or undertake to guarantee that  
the required functionality will continue to be available. Because 
of the loss of control and the transfer of risk it is unlikely that  
the whole service provision would be outsourced.
If PBC is seen as encouraging contractors to be innovative,  
then any new product or process would need testing before 
implementation. Unless the innovations had been tested 
previously, there would be every possibility that the constructor 
would bear the development costs and time of these innovations 
without any guarantee of a reduction in the construction cost. 
The disincentive for contractors to innovate using PBC would 
therefore remain.
The problems of service innovation can be seen as exaggerated 
forms of the problems of product innovation. High quality in 
products and building components is often perceived to arise 
when they have been tested and awarded a recognized 
standard from testing bodies such as the International 
Standards Organization (ISO) or the American Society of 
Technical Manufacturers (ASTM) or the European Commission 
(CEN). There is a considerable time lag between testing and 
implementation. Moreover, internationally, product standards  
are not always consistent (which is a necessary pre-requisite  
to establishing a successful trade in building products) (Foliente 
2000; Knocke 1993). Poirier et al., (2004) recognize the 
difficulties of certifying new processes and products and note 
that it takes time and many experts from many fields to 
understand the complexities of change approvals. Moreover, 
product quality is reduced by the practice of working to 
minimum standards as these may become the norm, rather than 
the minimum, and as it becomes increasingly uncompetitive to 
exceed the norm, revised standards are issued to enable the 
current market players to conform. This is partly brought about 
by representing the interests of the suppliers on the committees 
who negotiate standards, and partly through inculcating an 
attitude in the producer’s workforce that quality is someone 
else’s remit, not their own (Kanter, 1983; Dawson 1996). These 
arguments provide some of the justification for removing a 
reliance on specifying standardized materials and components 
and moving towards enabling suppliers to decide for 
themselves the best and most innovative way to achieve a 
client’s aims.
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Foliente (2000) describes the proposed development of 
performance-based codes. These would describe required 
performance in terms of quantity and ideally in terms of risk. 
This, according to Foliente, would then give designers more 
freedom to provide alternative solutions under their terms of the 
PBC arrangements. However, designers may prefer to include 
tried and tested products and processes because they are 
known, less risky and easier to monitor, especially if they have  
a delayed-reward contract. The purpose of codes or regulations 
is to enable designers to prescribe certain performance-based 
products knowing that they have a minimum standard. All the 
products in that group would then comply with a particular 
performance criterion. In the interim, prescriptive bases may  
be safe and low risk but prone to declining standards and 
unchallenging solutions.
A key problem in PBC is whether to specify that the building 
must perform to the client’s requirements before the constructors 
can claim their rewards, or to simply make the builder liable for 
financial losses that stem from non-performance. Either way, this 
liability will need underpinning if it is to have any meaning. 
Financial backing for these liabilities could be provided by a 
number of mechanisms, most of which are discussed in 
Hughes, Hillebrandt and Murdoch (1998), an area that mainly 
lies beyond the scope of this report.
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02 Risk
    ibson and Louargand (2001, p50) argue that   
    “a key reason for outsourcing is to transfer risks  
    to a third party that can manage the risks more   
    effectively.” From the clients’ point of view PBC   
	 	 	 	 offers	an	opportunity	to	offload	some	of	their	 
risks on to the contractors.
Bramwell (2003) discusses PBC in terms of a contract that 
focuses on achieving a required outcome rather than a contract 
to supply a set of prescribed physical specifications. This, 
according to Bramwell, involves the use of functional terms in 
the contract to describe how a completed building will operate 
rather than specifying how a building will be constructed. He 
provides an example of where this approach was successfully 
utilized for the procurement of a school in Western Australia.  
It is clear that performance may be defined at a number of 
different levels: in terms of the overall building, particular 
components, systems or sub-systems, specific materials (as  
in a performance standard), a performance building code or  
other regulatory document, a performance tender, contract or 
sub-contract. Similarly, Kashiwagi et al., (2003a) define PBC in 
terms of the performance required by the owner rather than the 
methods of performance, such as building specifications or 
design, thus reducing the need for detailed documentation  
but at the cost of increasing the contractor’s liability and risk.
In PBC, the building itself is viewed as an intermediate output 
and construction is focused on delivering (or paying for) a 
finished built facility. With an emphasis on what the final output 
achieves, rather than what it is made of, the procurement 
method and period of liability is inevitably extended under PBC. 
If a supplier has a responsibility for performance, then their 
contractual liability must extend into the performance period. 
This has the effect of further increasing the risk to the 
contractor. As Smith et al., (2003) point out in their discussion  
of a case study of early design development in an apartment 
project, the identification and allocation of risks partly determine 
the procurement method and the building process.
PBC clearly alters the nature of risk and its allocation. This 
raises important questions concerning the identification and 
management of risk under PBC from a contractor’s point of 
view. To date, little empirical research work has been carried out 
on the management of risk under PBC, even though a number 
of projects have been procured in this way.
Risk management involves risk identification and risk allocation. 
Construction risks have been identified by a number of 
authorities, including Flanagan and Norman (1999), who list  
the following areas in the construction process, where problems 
may arise: design, construction costs, latent defects, faulty 
materials, safety, completion deadlines and quality. PBC 
includes these risks for the contractor especially as some of 
these problem areas may become apparent during the life of  
the building and not during the construction phase. PBC thus 
extends the reward structure both in scope and in time. The 
responsibility for construction and some ongoing performance 
falls to the contractor. In principle, in return for taking on 
performance risk, the contractor should be rewarded when the 
building performs. The corollary of this is that the contractor  
is not rewarded when the building fails to perform as agreed.  
This allocation of risk, however, gives rise to some different and 
differently-weighted risks from those in traditional construction.
Risk is a combination of the three factors of probability, 
frequency and magnitude. Probability is the likelihood of 
something going wrong, whereas frequency is the number of 
times someone engages with a particular risk and magnitude is  
a	measure	of	the	impact	of	an	event.	All	three	aspects	influence	
the way that someone might respond to a risk. Probability of 
risk is difficult to assess in building projects because each 
project will have unique characteristics making it impossible to 
predict with any degree of reliability how likely the risky event is. 
Buildings are too dissimilar. However, when a series of buildings 
is repetitive, it becomes possible to assess probabilities to  
some extent. Inputs and components of a building may stand 
statistical scrutiny, but most often a building as a whole cannot. 
This is a problem partly caused by the lack of systematically 
collected performance data and reliability data. Adams (1995),  
in his discussion on risks, argues that risk management strategy 
in the 1990s was more concerned with reducing risk rather than 
balancing the costs of risk mitigation and the benefits of a 
reduction in the number of the most adverse events occurring. 
Lo’s (1999) approach to risk management theory is based on  
a synthesis of research in economics, psychology and the 
decision sciences. He suggests that total risk management 
involves price, preferences and probabilities. The intersection  
of these concepts is the decision point for deciding whether  
to bear or hedge the risk and this decision would be taken  
by	the	individuals	involved	influenced	by	their	diverse	 
risk preferences.
G
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PBC may be seen as an attempt to change the way risks are 
allocated on a construction project by shifting them from client  
to producer. But this may be a somewhat naïve view, especially 
when public sector projects are considered. For example, 
transferring to the private sector the performance risk associated 
with, say, a prison, may increase the contractor’s risk, but if the 
contractor fails to perform, the public sector client still has to 
provide the prison: non-performance is not an option. Therefore, 
there is not a finite amount of risk. In this example, risk to 
contractors may be arbitrarily increased. By implication, if 
buildings are the focus of subjective and unmeasurable 
risk-identification, only those producers who are confident in 
calculating the subjective risks and reward structures would be 
willing to accept a PBC project. Bing et al., (2005) researched risk 
allocation amongst Private Finance Initiative projects (PFI) and 
came to the conclusion that public sector clients felt that most 
risks should be passed onto the private sector constructors with 
appropriate “risk compensation”. As PFI is a good example of 
PBC in practice, it is demonstrable from PFI that PBC more 
generally also increases the allocation of risk to the producer/
provider, although for reasons mentioned above, there is not 
necessarily a corresponding reduction in risk for the buyer.
Kashiwagi et al., (2003b), note that when contractors carry  
the risks in PBC, the position of the client is strengthened, 
because, in principle, the contractor relies on the client for 
payment after completion when the building is in use. However,  
if, by the time the building is constructed, clients’ financial 
positions have weakened, contractors may be extremely 
vulnerable	financially	as	their	cash	flows	remain	dependent	on	
their clients. Only the public sector can guarantee contractors’ 
rewards by offering a guaranteed income stream. In any case  
it is unclear whether clients would choose to be in a position  
in, which they abdicated all decisions to the building supplier 
without payment until the building began to ‘perform’ 
according to some pre-determined criteria.
The risk of performance failure is real and potentially onerous  
for contractors and for clients. Most rational responses to an 
unavoidable increase in risk involve price increases, either to 
build up a contingency or to pay for some form of hedging of 
risk. PBC may therefore lead to higher construction costs.
One response of the industry to increased risk is to spread  
the risk by forming consortia. Hayes et al., (1987) discuss risk 
management from the contractors’ point of view. Although they 
are not concerned with the issue of consortia they discuss the 
issue of risk management, arguing that an appropriate contract 
strategy involves consideration of the organisational structure 
needed to control both design and construction and the 
relationship between them. The allocation of risk between the 
various parties may not be best served by traditional contracting 
arrangements in undertaking high risk complex projects. When 
difficulties arise on site or when there are major cost overruns it 
may be too late to avoid the costs of delay, arbitration or litigation. 
They advocate “active management of a risk by all parties.” 
(Hayes et al.,1987: 24)
Few papers have been published on the practical implications 
of the way that PBC changes risks, apart from Gruneberg, et al., 
(2007). Other papers have studied the risk implications of 
transferring risk from the public to the private sector, including 
Price et al., 2004. Managing risk is also discussed in Gruneberg 
and Hughes (2005) who point out that special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) are often used as a shell company to operate a PFI 
agreement. These joint venture companies have few assets and 
are quite separate from their parent firms, who form consortia in 
order to undertake large projects.
These consortia form an additional layer of management to 
manage risk as one of their functions. Consequently they form  
a barrier between the public sector client and the private sector 
firms that actually carry out the project work. Indeed, most 
current examples of PBC are accomplished by the introduction 
of a third party between builders and procurers, for example in 
PFI the third party may be an SPV and in leased office space,  
it may be a developer. Where a contractor acts as a developer, 
such as in speculative housebuilding or office development, 
then the contractor takes all the risks of procurement. 
Risk
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SPVs are one method used by the private sector to deal with 
the risks associated with public sector projects. These SPVs 
have no assets, except their contracts and some non-recourse 
financing. SPVs only work because the public sector client has 
a guaranteed income stream and the companies concerned can 
price the risks accordingly. In the private sector this does not 
apply and the risks would be prohibitively large over the long 
term. Moreover, the proposition that a firm (or an SPV) may take 
on obligations but have no resources to back them up, appears 
to be contrary to the whole concept of PBC. Shell companies 
would not be able to satisfactorily discharge PBC, as they 
would have no resources to back up their obligations. In PBC, 
the PBC operator would be required to have a portfolio of 
projects to be able to cross-subsidize, if necessary, in such a 
way that their liabilities were not allowed to exceed their assets 
or some other form of guarantee or insurance. Their liabilities 
under PBC arrangements must be underpinned by their assets 
or some form of financial arrangement.
Under PBC, active risk management would suggest that a 
construction project should begin with an analysis of the main 
objectives and risks, followed by the identification of roles and 
responsibilities, and only then the identification of contractual 
terms, which would bind the parties in legal relationships. This  
is the opposite of the more usual practice of starting with a 
standard-form contract and adapting it to suit particular 
circumstances. Consortia may be viewed as organizational 
structures, which take risk into account at the earliest stages in  
a project rather than waiting for problems to arise at a later 
stage. They are one method of dealing with risk at the inception  
of projects.
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    anks and property developers with joint contractual   
    financial arrangements may participate in the   
    management and production of projects by being   
    partners in a construction consortium. But they are  
only part of the management and production of projects.  
The actual building production is undertaken by a supply chain  
of a number of firms. The consortium forms a buffer between  
the public sector clients and the technology and resources  
used in the process. Yet construction consortia are often used  
to deliver PFI projects for the public sector. It is therefore worth 
considering the role of consortia in projects involving PBC.
3.1 Risk management in conosortia
The management of risk through the use of consortia may be 
viewed as an industry response to demand put to it by the 
public sector and very large private sector clients, especially 
where PBC is perceived to increase the risk profile of projects 
from the point of view of contractors. Demand is put to the 
industry in the form of project proposals. These projects tend  
to be very large and complex.
At any one time construction firms hold a portfolio of discrete 
projects on which they are working. Only firms of a certain 
capacity can undertake work over a certain size or complexity. 
When the workload exceeds that size, firms have no option but 
to seek partners. Otherwise the exposure to risk represented  
by one large project may threaten the requirement to balance 
risk in a firm’s portfolio of projects. For this reason the relative 
commitment of any one firm to any particular project is limited. 
As PBC would entail a far greater financial commitment than 
other construction-only contracts, it would imply a 
disproportionate exposure to losses.
An SPV is a formal accounting and contractual arrangement  
set up by one or more firms to undertake a project or a series  
of projects separate from the accounts of the firm(s) comprising 
the special purpose vehicle. Thus, not all SPVs are consortia. 
However, consortia invariably set up SPVs after being selected 
to carry out specific work, and the members of the consortium 
become shareholders of the SPV.
An alternative approach to collaborative working is presented  
by Egan (1998), who suggests that major public sector building 
procurers could encourage the industry to integrate the 
construction process. These teams of firms would not 
necessarily be consortia, but they would form integrated project 
teams (IPT). IPTs would consist of all those firms involved with 
the design, manufacture, assembly, installation, operation and 
maintenance of the building and they would work closely with 
the client over the whole process with a view to achieving the 
customer’s business objectives. Furthermore, the Specialist 
Engineering Contractors Group (2003) advocate that the 
selection of IPTs should be based on best value rather than 
lowest price. This would be seen as providing participating firms 
with opportunities to produce cost-effective solutions, enhance 
their own profit margins and secure greater continuity of work. 
3.2 Types of consortia
Although some construction consortia may appear to include 
contractors, many PFI bids are assembled by developers and 
financiers, using a contractor only to present a technical input  
to the client. In practice, the construction contractors are kept  
at arm’s length and are not full participating members of the 
consortium. There is no one form that defines construction 
consortia. On the contrary there are several types of 
consortia: developer-financial consortia, developer-financial-
contractor consortia, client-developer consortia and single-
type-organization consortia. Some are involved in the 
essential commercial risk-taking of projects while others are 
involved in the building production process and some 
combine commercial risk, construction and service provision. 
Variants of the consortium concept also depend on the 
relative size, skills and financial inputs of the various parties 
needed to meet the specific demands of each project, 
building or service requirement.
3.3 Relationships between firms in consortia
In their paper discussing a survey of supply chains, Akintoye,  
et al., (2000) point out that although they found improvements in 
planning and purchasing, a number of barriers remained, which 
inhibited collaborative working. They found a hostile culture in 
the industry amongst senior managers in the top construction 
contractors they interviewed, and a lack of commitment to 
supply chain management (a form of IPT in which specialist 
subcontractors are engaged in a close working relationship with 
the main contractor). They also found organizational structures, 
which failed to encourage collaboration. This collaboration 
could be achieved through incentivization and this in turn could 
be achieved through PBC.
However, it remains to be seen if incentives could be devised 
that would overcome the consortium nature of construction, 
which, according to Pearce (2003: 23), creates major difficulties 
between the various participants in the building process and 
adds to the transaction costs of delivering “consistent work 
patterns and effective communication”.
03 Consortia
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04 Research issues
    BC may be seen as a potential development of PFI,   
    which overcomes some of the difficulties of PFI.  
    PBC may alter the perception of privately procured  
    services for the public sector, given that privatization 
has transformed ownership patterns in the UK. A number of  
issues emerge.
•	 	Because	the	ownership	of	buildings	comes	outside	the	
contractual arrangements in PBC, does PBC simplify public 
sector procurement? It may enable the public sector to 
concentrate on performance outcomes, standards of service 
and monitoring rather than the micro-management of large 
diverse organizations such as the NHS.
•	 	How	can	PBC	be	implemented	and	what	are	the	steps	 
that need to be taken?
•	 	What,	if	any,	are	the	implications	of	PBC	for	the	 
construction industry?
•	 	Would	the	construction	industry	need	to	re-organize	and	
adapt or would new agencies emerge, which undertake 
construction processes as well as service provision on behalf 
of government? For example, property development may be 
combined with facilities management and service provision.
Whichever procurement method is adopted the purpose of any 
project is determined by each stakeholder from its own point of 
view. Each participant in the process has a particular set of 
interests, aims and constraints. The public sector’s aim is 
assumed to be to increase welfare, whereas one of the aims of 
contractors, consultants, private developers is assumed to be to 
increase turnover and ultimately profits. The objectives of public 
and private sector participants may be contradictory and 
therefore not always in harmony with each other.
One	manifestation	of	the	conflicting	interests	and	 
objectives of some of the different stakeholders is 
played out in the procurement methods used. This 
study of PBC is therefore related to the costs of 
tendering and procurement. The procurement  
method finally selected will depend on a number  
of factors including political will, the state of the  
construction market, and the availability of  
resources in manpower and materials.  
These factors determine the relative  
economic power of the participants.
This investigation considers questions regarding the 
characteristics of construction contractors that emerge  
in discussions on PBC including: 
•	 organizational	structure	
•	 financial	structure	
•	 bargaining	power	
•	 integration	with	suppliers	
•	market	position	
•	 contractor’s	role	(merchant	or	professional);	and	
•	 liability	for	performance.	
This research also discusses some of the contractual principles 
that would be needed to underpin developments in procurement 
and contracting methods in the UK to facilitate PBC, and the 
impact of PBC on the way in which firms are structured and 
projects are managed.
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05 Method
    artly because of the risks to the client and partly   
    because of the difficulties faced by suppliers, it is   
    unlikely that PBC for whole building provision will   
    always be viable or appropriate. However, it may be 
possible to offer PBC at sub-system levels such as M&E 
services, furnishings and building maintenance. To investigate 
this, it was decided to conduct a number of interviews with 
decision makers engaged in different aspects of the 
development and construction processes. Diverse responses 
were anticipated, each appropriate to different kinds of building, 
different kinds of building components, different kinds of deal 
and different firms.
Contractors are not an homogeneous group. The Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) divides the construction industry 
into five 3-digit classifications and these form the basis of our 
analysis of the business ratios of contractors. If their financial 
structures differ widely these differences may partly account  
for differences in approach to PBC between the various 
classifications. Our investigation focuses on detailed issues 
regarding the kind of construction contractor that would  
emerge in terms of organizational structure, financial structure, 
bargaining power, integration with suppliers, market position, 
contractor’s role (merchant or professional), liability for 
performance, and so on.
P
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Contract terms are considered in terms of ownership of 
assets, the acquisition of building sub-systems and the 
liabilities associated with the operation and performance  
of completed structures.
The move towards PBC for procuring parts of buildings requires  
an understanding of the needs of the client. The person who 
specifies what is to be bought should be the one with most 
knowledge of the client’s programme. This suggests that the  
way that projects are managed should be expected to change. 
The construction industry may provide general construction 
project managers, but it may be more appropriate for clients  
to develop their own project management skills in-house.
In order to carry out an assessment of contractors’ attitudes 
towards risk management of PBC, a telephone survey was 
conducted. The survey was targeted at the top 50 UK 
construction companies, ranked by turnover, (Building 
Magazine, 2004). The measurement of size by turnover  
was preferred to operating profit because profit is related  
to management expertise and for this particular research, 
contractor turnover was a better measure of the work 
undertaken by firms. The questionnaire (see Appendix A)  
was targeted at senior managers or directors with responsibility  
for strategic decisions. 
Forty-five companies were contacted and 22 responses 
received. Most questions (Appendix A) were open-ended.  
For example, respondents were invited to suggest what they 
considered to be the risks associated with PBC (see Appendix 
C) and subsequent questions related to the risks they identified. 
Respondents to the survey included marketing directors, 
commercial directors, managing directors, risk managers, 
regional directors, business development managers, directors 
of risk, finance directors, chief estimators, and quality and 
standards executives. From these responses, it was possible 
to conclude that some had board-level responsibilities; others 
were middle-managers and others office clerks.
Senior managers in large construction firms, many of whom are 
involved in PFI projects, might be expected to understand PBC 
concepts. However, when asked to define performance-based 
contracting, only 23% of respondents claimed to be aware of it. 
This may be because of unfamiliarity with the terminology.  
An operational definition of PBC was therefore provided for the 
purposes of securing consistent answers in the survey. 
Another aspect of this research has been the study of consortia 
in construction. As PBC of whole buildings requires the 
collaboration of a number of firms, the study of consortia is 
based on a literature review reinforced with interviews with  
a number of leading practitioners. Interviews with selected 
practitioners from the demand side and the supply side of 
consortia have enabled us to develop clear explanations and 
answers to the research questions. The interviewees represent  
a public sector client, a developer, a bank, a financial 
consultancy, an independent project manager, a construction 
industry consultant, two main contractors, a specialist 
subcontractor and a legal advisor. The size of firms approached 
ranged from small consultancies to relatively large firms, such 
as Bovis Lend Lease, Symonds and EMCOR Drake and Scull. 
Only one contractor’s responses are included in Tables 10 to  
13 below to maintain a balance of the different perspectives.
The interviews were divided into an open discussion of construction 
consortia and a series of specific questions designed to highlight 
particular issues. The questions covered two areas of interest; 
first, the setting up and operation of consortia and second, the 
management of risk and decision-making.
Eight structured interviews were conducted, based on the 
questions shown in Appendix B. In addition, two further 
interviews were carried out for the purposes of dealing with some 
specific outstanding issues. While these additional interviews are 
reported, they are not included in the tabular analysis.
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Analysis of specialist contractors was carried out using Financial 
Analysis Made Simple (FAME) published by Bureau van Dijk 
Electronic Publishing. The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 
95) 3-digit codes covering all parts of the construction industry 
were used to find the median values of a number of ratios. 
These construction sub-sectors were also compared to the 
equivalent ratios of firms in the auto repair and maintenance and 
auto manufacturing industries, in order to test the widespread 
assumption that construction is not like manufacturing. These 
were analysed to view the extent of variation in profit margins 
and capital structures of the firms in different specialisms.  
Table 2 defines the SIC codes used and the number of firms’ 
accounts analysed in the study. The predominant types of firm 
in construction are in SIC 45.2, SIC 45.3 and SIC 45.4, which 
together constitute approximately 97% of all firms studied. SIC 
45.1 and 45.5 are therefore omitted from our discussion, though 
they are included in the tables.
It can be noted that the variance within each subdivision is 
greater than the variation of the ratios between different 
sub-classes within the construction sector. Though inter-quartile 
ranges provide insights, to simplify the analysis in this report only 
medians are compared. Tables 3 to 9 summarize the full set of 
tables given in Appendix D. The annual median ratio for each 
year between 1996 and 2004 in each 3-digit class was found. 
The summary tables only show the highest and lowest annual 
median ratio found for each classification regardless of when it 
occurred between 1996 and 2004. 
This analysis relates to the hypothesis that only those firms with 
capital assets and relatively high profit margins are in a position  
to undertake PBC as their resources would be needed to 
finance	the	long	term	commitments	and	cash	flow	requirements.	
Medians were used. These were calculated for each ratio in 
each year in each 3-digit SIC code. It should be noted that the 
medians of each ratio of each SIC in each year relate to different 
firms and therefore do not indicate the profile of a theoretical 
median firm, even if such a concept could be defined.
The FAME data base is designed for current enquiries 
concerning existing firms. As a result the data base does not 
hold data on firms that no longer exist in the year of the latest 
version of FAME. Time series of the FAME data base are 
therefore biased in favour of those firms that survived. The 
population of firms in any past year declines the earlier the year. 
Indeed there are so few firms that appear in every year of the 
FAME data since 1996 that using a cohort of firms in 1996 
produces such small numbers that the result would not be 
meaningful or useful in any comparison of different SIC codes  
in this report. As a result it is not possible to aggregate the 
accounts for each year to form a time series of aggregate 
output. The approach adopted here is to use ratio analysis 
taking the median values for each ratio. This does not build a 
picture of an average firm overall as the different median ratios 
refer to different firms. 
As many specialist firms in construction undertake work in  
a number of different areas, it is not possible to analyse 
Companies House data in terms of specialisms or markets. 
Instead it is only possible to discuss the firms that carry out 
specialist work. The focus is therefore on the firms rather than 
the specialism.
In looking at a given year of data, the tax year is used. As some 
company year-ends occur shortly after the start of the year their 
accounts are mainly concerned with the preceding year. There is 
therefore a built in time lag in the data that should be noted.
Method
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Table 2: SIC codes and number of firms*
*Omitting firms with no account
45.1 1301 1Site preparation 
45.11 Demolition and wrecking of buildings; earth moving 
45.12 Test drilling and boring
122 596 100Totals
26 744 100Totals
34 1447 5Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
50 25 297 95Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel
45.5 2036 2Renting of construction or demolition equipment  
with operator 
45.50 Renting of construction or demolition equipment  
with operator
45.4 24 925 20Building completion 
45.41 Plastering 
45.42 Joinery installation 
45.43 Floor and wall covering 
45.44 Painting and glazing 
45.45 Other building completion
45.3 29 733 24Building installation 
45.31 Installation of electrical wiring and fittings 
45.32 Insulation work activities 
45.33 Plumbing 
45.34 Other building installation
45.2 64 601 53Building of complete constructions or parts thereof:  
civil engineering 
45.21 General construction of buildings and civil engineering 
works 
45.22 Erection of roof covering and frames 
45.23 Construction of highways, roads, airfields and  
sport facilities 
45.24 Construction of water projects 
45.25 Other construction work involving special trades
DescriptionSIC 95 3-digit codes Number of firms Percentage of firms
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6.1 Analysis of accounting data
    ne view expressed in a number of discussions held   
    with contractors during the research process was that  
    builders were not in a financial position to carry out   
    work under PBC. While it might be argued that 
contractors do not have the capital to undertake PBC, and  
that the risks of PBC are too great and too long term for 
contractors, it does not follow that firms in the construction 
industry could not build up the expertise to undertake the life 
cycle commitments necessary for PBC. The financial ability or 
capacity of firms in the construction industry to undertake the 
long term commitments implied in PBC is shown by a study  
of the accounts of construction firms. 
One of the key financial performance indicators of firms is the 
return on capital employed (ROCE). In Table 3, the median rate 
of return of firms in SIC 45.2 (Building of complete constructions 
or parts thereof; civil engineering) the ROCE varies from 18.3% 
in 1996 to 44.5% in 2004. In 45.3 (Building installation) the 
ROCE was 30.5% in 1997 rising to 100% in 2004. SIC 45.4 also 
displays returns on capital employed of 27.6% in 1996 to 104% 
in 2004. These figures compare to 9.9% in 2001 to 18.5% in 
1996 in auto manufacture and to 15% in 2000 and 23.5% in 
2004 in auto repair and maintenance.
The relatively high ratios in construction indicate that ROCE  
is not necessarily a useful measure of performance in the 
construction sector. These high rates of return occur because 
the business model of firms in the construction industry is 
based on the use of very little of their own capital and a  
negative	cash	flow.
The higher ROCE ratios in construction compared to the auto 
industry are due to the tendency of construction firms to employ 
relatively little capital by relying more on credit from suppliers 
(including plant hirers) and interim payments from clients, unlike 
firms in the automobile industry. This is an important distinction 
to draw as it implies that construction firms tend to be relatively 
insubstantial, in terms of capital employed, and highly geared. 
This can also be seen directly in the comparison below of the 
capital to output ratios, fixed asset ratios and gearing ratios of 
firms in construction compared to the auto industry.
06 Findings
Table 3: Median percentage ROCE in the construction and automotive sectors, 1996–2004
SIC Definition Low % High %
45.1 Site preparation 303.4 412
45.2 Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 18.3 44.5
45.3 Building installation 30.5 100
45.4 Building completion 27.6 103.7
45.5 Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator 13.2 17.6
34 Auto manufacture 9.9 18.5
50 Auto maintenance 15 23.5
O
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The hypothesis is that the capital to output ratio shows that 
firms in construction are able to generate a far higher turnover 
per £100 of capital employed than firms in the auto industry. If 
this is found to be the case, it would confirm the relatively high 
level of capital utilization in construction compared to auto 
manufacturing and automotive repair. A low capital to output 
ratio implies a high level of capital utilization.
The evidence to support the low capital to output ratio is given 
in Table 4 by the ratio of capital employed per £100 of turnover. 
In SIC 45.2 the capital employed per £100 of turnover tended to 
be between £12.60 in 2003 and £14.40 in 1997. In SIC 45.3 it 
was £9.47 in 2003 to £11.42 in 1997. In SIC 45.4 it was £7.70  
in 2003 and £10.80 in 1996. These figures are compared to the 
auto industry where the capital to output ratio of manufacturers 
was as high as £29 in 2003 and £41.30 in 1997, approximately  
3 to 4 times more capital per £100 of output than in construction. 
This demonstrates the relatively low level of capital construction 
firms employ to undertake work and the low level of capital 
investment by contractors. Their utilization of capital is 
considerably greater than in the automotive industry. This 
leaves little capital or capacity for contractors to guarantee  
their output. To measure the ability of firms to guarantee  
output, the proportion of capital available can be seen in  
terms of net current assets as a percentage of turnover.
The ratio of net current assets to turnover indicates the financial 
capacity	and	flexibility	of	construction	firms	to	deal	with	the	
short term liabilities that arise in the course of PBC from year to 
year. In Table 5, the median net current assets to turnover in SIC 
45.2, 45.3 and 45.4 range from as low as 1.6% to 5.5%. These 
figures are only slightly below the auto industry at 1.7% to 
7.3%, with a large overlap between the two industries. This 
implies that firms in the construction sector are no less able to 
meet short term obligations that might arise under PBC than 
firms in the auto industry.
Table 4: Median percentage capital employed to annual turnover ratio in the construction and automotive sectors, 1996–2004
SIC Definition Low % High %
45.1 Site preparation 21.8 30.8
45.2 Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 12.6 14.4
45.3 Building installation 9.5 11.4
45.4 Building completion 7.7 10.8
45.5 Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator 48.2 62.8
34 Auto manufacture 29 41.3
50 Auto maintenance 10.1 12.6
Table 5: Net current assets as a percentage of turnover in the construction and automotive sectors, 1996–2004
SIC Definition Low % High %
45.1 Site preparation 0.4 3.6
45.2 Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 4.3 5.5
45.3 Building installation 3.0 5.1
45.4 Building completion 1.6 3.3
45.5 Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator -10.9 -3.2
34 Auto manufacture 2.9 7.3
50 Auto maintenance 1.7 2.5
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If the availability of net current assets is not a good reason for 
contractors to avoid the commitments and liabilities of PBC, 
then another objection to contractors undertaking PBC might  
be based on the low profit margins found in the construction 
industry compared to the auto industry. Low profit margins do 
not permit firms to take on additional risks. There is evidence  
of relatively low profit margins in construction in Table 6. 
In SIC 45.2 the profit margins ranged from 3.71% in 1996 rising 
to 7.5% in 2004. In SIC 45.3 the profit margin was 4.0% in 1997 
and 11.3% in 2004. In SIC 45.4 the lowest median profit margin 
was 3.1% in 1996 and the highest was 13.7% in 2004. However, 
the auto manufacturers’ median profit margins in the same 
period only ranged from 2.2% to 5.8% and auto maintenance 
was even lower at 1.8% to 2.3% in the same period. The low 
profit margins in the auto industry do not prevent these firms 
from making good their faulty output albeit for a shorter period 
of time than implied under PBC and for a smaller percentage  
of turnover represented by each individual unit of output.  
The argument may therefore still be valid that the relative size  
of each unit of output in construction is too great for firms  
to give long term commitments on the profit margins found  
in construction.
Findings
Table 6 Median percentage profit margins in construction and automotive sectors, 1996–2004
SIC Definition Low % High %
45.1 Site preparation 5.8 8.9
45.2 Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 3.7 7.5
45.3 Building installation 4.0 11.3
45.4 Building completion 3.1 13.7
45.5 Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator 6.5 10.3
34 Auto manufacture 2.2 5.8
50 Auto maintenance 1.8 2.3
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In	order	to	operate	a	building	with	sufficient	financial	flexibility	 
to meet the physical obligations and contingencies of PBC, 
contractors require a certain level of liquidity in reserve. It may be 
argued that as profit margins in construction are low, generating 
reserves out of profits is not generally an option open to firms. 
One alternative is long term borrowing since PBC requires long 
term finance. However, long term borrowing is not exploited in 
construction because firms do not tend to have sufficient fixed 
assets to act as collateral for the amounts needed to finance 
production. This results in relatively low long term borrowing, 
which may appear to offer a sound financial base but in practice 
reflects	the	relatively	high	risk	of	lending	to	building	contractors.	
This	might	well	be	reflected	in	higher	rates	of	interest	charged	to	
building contractors, (assuming they are able to borrow long term 
finance in the first place to finance production rather than the 
purchase of fixed assets), compared to firms in other industries, 
not to mention public sector organizations.
The lower level of long term borrowing of construction firms 
compared to the auto industry is shown in Table 7, which gives 
the gearing ratio of long term borrowing to net assets. The 
gearing of firms in SIC 45.2 varies from 13% in 2002 to 17% 
in 1996; SIC 45.3 varies from 12% in 2002 to 15% in 1999;  
SIC 45.4 varies from 14% in 2004 to 18% in 1998. In the auto 
industry the median ratios ranged from 18.5% to 24% in those 
years, far higher than the equivalent in construction.
Table 7 Gearing in the construction and automotive sectors, 1996–2004
SIC Definition Low % High %
45.1 Site preparation 21 25
45.2 Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 13 17
45.3 Building installation 12 15
45.4 Building completion 14 18
45.5 Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator 25 30
34 Auto manufacture 18.5 23.4
50 Auto maintenance 19 24
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PBC assumes a long term commitment on the part of the 
contractor. Investment in fixed assets is a measure of a firm’s 
commitment to its future workload. Fixed assets may be financed 
out of long term debt and represent additional liabilities. Loans 
may have been fully repaid, in, which case the fixed assets are a 
measure of their net worth to the capital base. In any case, the 
ratio of fixed assets as a percentage of turnover indicates one of 
the overheads borne by sales, which can be seen as a level of 
risk for the contractor and therefore a commitment.
The ratio of fixed assets as a percentage of capital employed 
indicates the degree of the asset specificity of firms with assets 
in the form of buildings, plant and vehicles and can be taken as 
one measure of longer term planning and commitment. In Table 
8, the ratio of fixed assets over capital employed in SIC 45.2 
ranges from 39% in 2002 to 45.6% in 1997. In SIC 45.3 it 
ranges from 42.1% in 2001 to 53.8% in 2004 and in SIC 45.4 it 
ranges from 45% in 2001 to 60.8% in 2003. These figures tend 
to be below the ranges found in auto manufacturing (53.2% in 
2004 to 69.9% in 1997) and in auto maintenance (from 56.5%  
in 2002 to 68.6% in 1996). 
Findings
Table 8: Fixed assets as a percentage of capital employed in the construction and automotive sectors, 1996–2004
SIC Definition Low % High %
45.1 Site preparation 77.1 101.4
45.2 Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 39.0 45.6
45.3 Building installation 42.1 53.8
45.4 Building completion 45 60.8
45.5 Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator 100 110
34 Auto manufacture  53.2 69.9
50 Auto maintenance 56.5 68.6
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A further measure of the physical commitment of firms to the 
projects they undertake is their investment in specific plant  
and equipment needed to carry out the work. Although actual 
plant and equipment expenditure is not always available, the 
ratio of fixed assets to turnover is indicative of construction 
firms’ commitment to their clients compared to for example, 
auto manufacturing. However, this ratio is only one element in 
the equation. The study of consortia revealed that commitment 
on the part of a firm is also a function of its total financial 
commitment, its reputation, relationships between different 
suppliers and between the contractors and their clients.
The ratio combines the cost of fixed assets, which may be paid 
for over a number of years (and can in principle be large) and 
turnover, which is always an annual figure (and therefore limited). 
Nevertheless the ratio of fixed assets to turnover in construction 
tends to be very low. In Table 9 the ranges of the ratio of fixed 
assets to turnover were as follows: for SIC 45.2, it varied between 
5.4% in 2002 to 6.6% in 1997; SIC 45.3 it was 4.9%  
in 2001 to 5.7% in 2004; and in SIC 45.4 5.1% in 1997 to 5.9% 
in 2004. Fixed assets therefore represented only a small 
proportion of the value of annual turnover compared to auto 
manufacturing, which ranged from 23.3% in 2003 to 36.7% in 
1999. The equivalent ratios in auto maintenance were 7.2%  
in 2004 to 8.6%, which are similar to construction. The figures  
in	auto	maintenance	reflect	the	nature	of	maintenance	
compared to manufacture. It is simply not necessary to employ 
as much plant in maintenance compared to production facilities. 
It may well be the case that it is in the nature of construction 
production that less plant is required as a percentage of output 
than in manufacturing. This means that construction firms do 
not need the same volume of investment for production and this 
enables them to be more independent of their client base than 
in other sectors of the economy, even before legislation obliged 
manufacturers to guarantee their products. One aspect of this 
weaker relationship with their clients is that contractors in 
general may be less concerned with the performance of their 
output than manufacturers.
Table 9 Fixed assets as a percentage of turnover in the construction and automotive sectors, 1996–2004
SIC Definition Low % High %
45.1 Site preparation 17.1 27.95
45.2 Building of complete constructions or parts thereof; civil engineering 5.4 6.6
45.3 Building installation 4.9 5.7
45.4 Building completion 5.1 5.9
45.5 Renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator 55.5 70.0
34 Auto manufacture  23.3 36.7
50 Auto maintenance 7.2 8.6
*Omitting firms with no account
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This ratio analysis of construction firms indicates that construction 
firms in general may not be financially strong and therefore may 
not be capable of taking on work based on the performance of 
their constructed output. However, the use of medians to 
summarize the ratio analysis does not necessarily show that some 
firms in each sub-division of the construction industry could not 
take on the longer term commitments implicit in PBC.
The evidence of the analysis of the accounts of firms supports 
the argument that none of the major subdivisions of firms in the 
construction industry (SIC 45) is as well placed as the subdivisions 
of the auto industry to undertake post-completion long term 
responsibilities for the performance of output. Firms in the 
construction industry have inferior ratios for the purpose of  
PBC compared to the auto industry, especially considering the 
relative size of the units of output as a percentage of total 
output of the firm. Nor do firms in the construction industry tend 
to have the necessary asset structure to accommodate the 
additional risks of PBC. For this reason, they require either 
developers or banks to provide the necessary financial 
underpinning needed to ensure that expenditures can be met 
for the construction phase prior to payment by the client as 
required under PBC.
However, it should be emphatically noted that specific 
construction firms may well be able to accommodate the 
additional burdens imposed by PBC. It may be the case that the 
largest firms in all construction sub-sectors are capable of having 
the necessary financial reserves to enable them to undertake 
contracts based on performance. While it might be argued that 
contractors do not have the capital to undertake PBC, and that 
the risks of PBC are too great and too long term for contractors,  
it does not follow that they could not build up the expertise to 
undertake the life cycle commitments necessary for PBC.
Like so much innovation in the construction industry the change 
may well have to come from clients and be driven by them. The 
public sector client, acting as a ‘best-practice client’ may be in 
a position to create the conditions and terms necessary for 
contractors to respond with PBC. There is a need to decide 
what the performance levels should be and what outcomes are 
desirable. The client would need to give contractors a clearly 
defined project stating a building’s or structure’s function and 
broad outcomes e.g. the project could be a school, which is a 
well defined use, and the number of pupils to be housed with a 
number of facilities such as dining room, kitchen, library, gym, 
staff rooms and toilets may be broad outcomes together with 
environmental and energy use performance specifications. 
Contracting firms would then compete to construct and 
maintain the school and quality would be driven by the 
contractors’ need to protect their reputation and maintain good 
relations with their clients as well as their desire for repeat 
business. Moreover market principles would also shape their 
behaviour as contractors compete for market share and pursue 
growth policies.
6.2 Risk associated with performance-based contracting
This section considers risk management and the use of 
consortia as a method of managing, spreading and sharing risk 
with other firms due to undercapitalization in the construction 
sector. In a survey of senior managers in large construction 
firms, it was found that responsibility for risk management is  
not usually allocated to any one person or department in 
particular and it was rarely straightforward to ascertain the 
responsible person. Respondents were invited to describe 
risks they associated with PBC. From the results of the enquiry, 
seven key risk groups emerged from the use of common terms 
by respondents. These are ranked in Table 10, according to 
the frequency they were mentioned by respondents.
Findings
 Percentage of  
Area of risk respondents
FFP and associated insurance issues 36
Costs 16
Measurement (performance and indicators) 12
Briefing/specification 10
Contractual issues 10
Resource issues 8
Creativity issues 6
Communication 1
Safety 1
Total 100
Table 10: Frequency of respondent-suggested key risks
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Clearly fitness for purpose (FFP) and associated insurance 
issues are the most frequently perceived risks for contractors. 
Many contractors explained that they would consider accepting 
only ‘reasonable skill and care’ as this is an insurable risk. But FFP 
is apparently a problem for insurers and is usually excluded  
in professional indemnity (PI) policies because of the allocation  
of strict liability, a point, which could render PI an unhelpful 
safeguard for clients. The problem lies in the nature of a 
guarantee, which is, in general, uninsurable and, therefore, 
dependent on resources that lie behind the risk-taker, in relation 
to their liability. According to the respondents, many clients 
would want to pass FFP obligations on to contractors as well  
as risks associated with ‘skill and care’. Responsibility for FFP 
may also make the contractor vulnerable to any late change in 
the client’s purpose.
Table 11 shows how respondents said they would manage the 
risks they had previously named. Not having had any experience 
of managing PBC risks, most respondents tended to mention 
that they would manage them as they would manage their 
existing arrangements. In dealing with the first risk, product 
quality, their management strategy involved ensuring that 
suppliers retained liability, and that they themselves obtained 
appropriate sourcing of components, used only proven, 
inspected and tested products, and ensured defects liability 
periods were stated. Second, the risk associated with FFP was 
found to be unacceptable to contractors. They stated they were 
not prepared to take on FFP conditions. As far as contractors 
were concerned, responsibility for their output only extended to 
reasonable skill and care in the construction and maintenance 
phases. The third type of risk, contractual risk, could be dealt 
with by adopting a formal risk register as part of the contract to 
identify the allocation of risk to the different parties involved. 
FFP was considered by one respondent to be too onerous to  
be included in any contract. One reason for considering FFP  
to be too onerous was given by a number of interviewees,  
who commented that it was not always possible to arrive at a 
consensus on the definition of functionality and therefore the 
contractor might not be paid. Obtaining the client’s complete 
specification was seen as an obstacle, particularly during the 
bidding phase.
Contractors were asked, which of the PBC risks they identified 
they would be prepared to absorb and, which they would pass 
on to clients. Their preferences are shown in Table 12. The 
majority of respondents (63%) who answered this question did 
not express a particular preference; which may have been the 
result of lack of experience of PBC and its potential for risk 
management. PBC could be perceived as either an opportunity 
or a threat, depending on whether one was client or producer.
 Percentage of  
Type of risk respondents*
Product quality 32
FFP 20
Contractual issues 12
Other 16
No comment 20
Total 100
Table 11: Risk management strategy of PBC risk
 Percentage of  
Risk allocation respondents
Clients 11
Shared between clients/component suppliers 11
Contractors 7
Shared between contractors/clients 4
Suppliers 4
Don’t know 63
Total 100
Table 12: Contractors’ preferences for risk allocation
NB: Some respondants listed more than one stratagy.
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Findings
 Percentage of  
Circumstances respondents
Under PFI arrangements 9
Criteria must be properly expressed 5
Risk assessment favourable 5
Company policy 5
If the contractor were also the developer 5
Only on minor projects 5
Would not accept PBC 66
Total 100
Table 13: Potential use of PBC
A number of respondents felt that suppliers were required to 
take the risk for new products but they also commented that 
suppliers generally did not return to take responsibility if their 
products failed. In general these answers were inconsistent  
with their responses to the management of risk, where the 
contractors	sought	to	offload	all	risks	either	to	their	suppliers	 
or their clients. 
Risk absorption through the contract in the United Kingdom 
(UK) was felt to be inadequate as standard contracts do not 
cover all risks. Clients were perceived as attempting to place 
risks onto the contractor either through the job or through the 
contract. Contractors stated that they would prefer to be 
involved in the contract negotiations at the inception stages  
of	projects.	They	also	noted	that	risks	are	currently	shuffled	
between the contracting parties as the project progresses – 
even on PFI projects – rather than being fixed allocations 
throughout the entire project.
In view of the difficulties in identifying and managing risk under 
PBC, respondents were asked under what conditions or 
circumstances (if any) they would be prepared to use PBC.  
Their responses are given in Table 13.
One of the most significant results from this survey is that most 
contractors (66%) felt that they would not accept a PBC 
contract, although under PFI contracts, it might be acceptable. 
Once again, FFP was often given as a reason while others noted 
that risk decisions were made on a job-by-job basis, which did 
not take into account any long term obligations beyond the 
construction phase of a contract. Five percent of respondents 
said that PBC might be acceptable on minor projects only, 
reinforcing the point made in the ratio analysis above, that firms 
in the auto industry produce and sell units of production that 
only represent a relatively small percentage of output compared 
to construction, where each project tends to represent a 
significant share of a firm’s annual production and is therefore a 
greater threat to the firm’s survival should something go wrong.
To some extent the issues of post-construction liabilities were 
recognized	by	contractors.	They	managed	this	risk	by	offloading	
it onto their suppliers. If contractors were not prepared to take 
on long term liabilities beyond completion, many of them 
nevertheless considered that their suppliers or subcontractors 
should. They were asked if they required their suppliers or  
sub-contractors to be responsible for their inputs beyond 
building completion. Of the respondents, 38% required their 
suppliers to accept responsibility beyond completion, 21% 
required it from their sub-contractors and 25% did not know. 
6.3 Consortia as a method of dealing with risk
As pointed out above, the use of consortia is one method that 
may appear to spread the burden of risk and in so doing it may 
be argued that consortia reduce risk to individual participating 
firms. Moreover, different firms working together with different 
specialist skills, and more diverse management expertise than 
any single firm, appear to offer lower risk solutions. However,  
far from reducing uncertainty, consortia can also be seen as 
increasing some firms’ exposure to risk. This apparent paradox 
can be resolved by thinking in terms of overall risk reduction 
and individual firms’ risk exposure. While each firm may 
experience additional risk factors, many of these risks are  
part of a zero sum game, in, which the total risk to the client is 
reduced. For example, value engineering implies that solutions 
can be found, which reduce the total cost of construction.  
At the same time, design changes brought about by the value 
engineering exercise may mean that one or more members of 
the consortium may find their services are no longer required.
The major group of identified risks is concerned with the 
implications of working very closely with other firms or 
organizations. This area of risk associated with consortia may 
be called reputational risk. Reputational risk is not limited. In  
any case all respondents stated that limited liability makes no 
difference where large projects are concerned. In effect any firm 
that fails to perform to the satisfaction of its public sector clients 
will find it extremely difficult to continue to supply services  
to public sector organizations. Indeed if any firm consistently 
underperformed, it would find it difficult to win more work, 
especially in the public sector. This reduces demand for the 
firm’s output, depending on the ratio of public to private sector 
work the firm carries out. Even private sector clients may be 
deterred by a firm’s tainted reputation. 
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The interdependence of firms in consortia has the potential to 
break up working relationships between members, leading to  
a significant loss in a firm’s turnover. As consortia often work 
closely with local authorities, an additional risk facing firms is 
the lack of understanding of commercial risk by many in the 
public sector. Indeed political disputes between different local 
authorities (where projects overlap into neighbouring council 
territories) and between local authorities and central government 
can also lead to difficulties for consortia members.
A further risk for firms in consortia is the changing capacity of 
fellow firms to fulfil their obligations to the consortium. Given 
that each firm is engaged on a number of projects outside the 
consortium and because of the lumpiness of demand facing any 
one firm in property and construction, each member firm’s 
capacity available to the consortium can vary widely over the  
life of a consortium.
There are other soft issues, for example the tying up of 
resources, such as expensive senior management, which 
interferes with the smooth running of the organization, especially 
as there is no guarantee of success. This would also apply 
where no consortium is formed but selection for many public 
sector projects is not based on a single firm’s strengths or offer, 
but on the combined strengths and merits of the consortium as  
a whole. Success, for example from a consortium funder’s point 
of view, is also dependent on the selection process, which may 
be based on design or facilities management features and not 
just the banking aspects of the bid.
Risks within consortia may be classed as attributable and 
non-attributable risks. Attributable risks may be taken by 
members according to their skills and roles within the 
consortium. Non-attributable risks may be taken by the 
consortium leader or the funder.
Although property developers may argue that it is they, who 
accept responsibility for projects, risks are borne by those in  
the weakest negotiating position, because they can be most 
easily replaced. Therefore those who offer non-differentiated 
services are in the most vulnerable position. The firms in the 
weakest negotiating position are the contractors and their 
sub-contractors. Perceived risk is taken by the developers and 
constructional risk is taken by the contractors. Perceived risk, 
which may be speculative or commercial risk, is rewarded with 
the profits (net of construction costs). The constructional risk is 
therefore left to contractors to price correctly and profitably 
(while still winning the auction for work). Risks are thus identified 
and allocated to the firm best able to manage them. That firm 
then owns the risk. Construction is seen as a high risk, high 
volume and low-margin business.
The contractor is usually responsible for cost overruns as 
construction contracts are usually fixed price unless design 
changes are delivered late. If the design changes originate in  
the consortium, the consortium would then be responsible for 
the delay and additional costs. Otherwise, the bank, according 
to one banker, still carries the main responsibility for costs 
because it is the bank that provides 90% of the funding. 
However, the bank usually holds collateral security and 
manages	actual	cash	flow	and,	hence,	controls	the	contractual	
arrangements of the constructor or facility manager. Risks other 
than construction risks may be seen as residual risks. Residual 
risks are taken or assumed in proportion to the consortium 
shareholdings of partners, or by the lead bidder. Alternatively, 
the client may carry the risk rather than waste or lose time.
Nevertheless, several interviewees pointed out a number of 
factors relating to consortia, which actually reduce the level of 
risk, because they reduce uncertainty in the process. This is 
partly achieved by making use of a broader knowledge base 
than could be afforded by one organization working alone. Risks 
are also reduced because consortia can make use of the 
experience of the different partners who may have worked on 
similar projects.
The sharing of bidding costs and the spreading of financial risk 
over a number of firms and organizations also reduce risks faced 
by members of a consortium. The larger the asset base the easier 
and cheaper it is to raise finance, assuming all else remains the 
same. As a number of firms combine to form a consortium the 
asset base may be enlarged to allow for greater access to funding 
at lower rates of interest and therefore lower risk. Consortia allow 
members additional exit routes if they wish to leave a project by 
finding a suitable and acceptable replacement without 
necessitating the abandonment of the project.
Consortia tend to be formed only when firms have little 
alternative. Indeed, one interviewee stated it was not his firm’s 
strategy to enter into consortia agreements. Consortia are not 
seen as vehicles for improving collaborative working. Again, it 
was stated that best practice in construction does not depend 
on consortia. This is not to say that consortia inhibit best 
practice. Firms rely on their bargaining strengths even within 
consortia arrangements.
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Influence	and	control	within	consortia	are	based	on	financial	
commitment and equity share. Even where contractors may be 
deemed to lead consortia, further enquiry may reveal that the 
contractor’s financial input and control is provided by a property, 
investment or development arm of the same company. The 
examples or case studies given by interviewees tended to 
support the view that consortia are marketing and financially 
driven arrangements, which take on commercial and reputational 
risks. A separate supply chain of contractors takes on the 
production risk which may extend to the provision of services 
after completion of construction. In some cases a contractor 
may be a member of both the consortium and the supply chain, 
in which case it is possible for the contractor to be sued by the 
consortium of, which it is a shareholder.
The public sector client saw the aim of a consortium as a group 
of companies brought together for a particular purpose (for 
example constructing a building), because of the expertise of 
the different firms. In joint ventures, the partners take equal 
liability. In consortia the consortium takes the financial risk and 
manages the supply chain.
As a public sector client, one interviewee would have welcomed 
the opportunity to establish long term relationships with 
construction consortia. But this did not arise, partly because 
many in the public sector have a fear and distrust of the profit 
motive. Nevertheless, public-private partnerships enable the 
public and private sectors to share problems and develop closer 
working relationships. This enables the public and private 
sectors to play-off each other to their mutual benefit. Longer-
term partnerships with the private sector could be developed  
in return for local authority sites. This arrangement takes 
advantage of the private sector skills of managing procurement, 
while the government sector remains accountable to the public.
Because many civil servants tend to have little direct knowledge 
or experience of commerce, the public sector does not always 
have the necessary skills in managing procurement. The public 
sector is more concerned with non-commercial issues, such  
as public service provision and accountability, than commercial 
considerations. It is, therefore, relatively poor at making 
commercial decisions. The public sector cannot take on 
financial risks such as cost overruns, late delivery and 
unresolved disputes. As a result the public sector is willing  
to pay for the private sector to take the risks associated with 
projects. Nevertheless the private sector tries to put the financial 
risks back on to the public sector. Consortium decisions were 
often not conveyed to the client, but were informally 
communicated by chance in meetings between the client and 
the consortium. Distrust is played on by advisors. In spite of 
these difficulties in public-private sector collaboration, there is  
a need for a leap of trust.
These issues indicate that far from being an open method of 
procuring a building or structure, it is possible for members  
of a consortium to obscure important details of a project from  
the client. This highlights the self-interested behaviour of the  
parties in the construction process, allowing for predictable 
opportunistic transaction costs and game theory outcomes  
of the hawk dove variety.
Developers are prepared to take commercial risk only provided 
they are in a position to hire or dismiss the other members of the 
team. Indeed although the relationship with other members of the 
consortium may be closer than in non-joint ventures, joint venture 
organizations work best when there are several projects to be 
undertaken. With the developer in a position to remove partners 
from the team, the developer has a sanction if things go wrong. 
At the same time there is less chance of contractors behaving 
opportunistically if they are at risk of losing further participation in 
the joint venture. This applies similarly to subcontractors.
These comments illustrate the divisions that exist within 
consortia, showing the level of distrust of developers towards 
contractors, their relative negotiating strengths and their 
attitudes towards risk.
Funders view consortia as business opportunities but not ones 
to be carried out by a single firm or funder. From the point of 
view of the partners in a consortium, the main aim of setting up 
a consortium is to win the bid. Once this has been achieved 
each member of the consortium receives a contract and the 
bank funds the project. Consortia represent the integration of 
the vertical value chain by working together in collaborative 
teams. The consortium whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts. It can be argued that one of the benefits of working as a 
consortium on a construction project is that it improves value 
management. It also increases the reliability of the bid price 
compared to many recent public sector directly commissioned 
works, though this may not necessarily always be the case.
Contractors may see participating in consortia as a construction 
market segment. Consortia bidding for NHS and local authorities’ 
projects may be contractor-led but usually contractors are 
brought in at a later stage. Perhaps as much as 70% of 
consortia are not led by contractors. However there may be a 
trend towards contractors becoming more involved. There is no 
incentive for contractors to invest in consortia for the long term, 
if they only have a construction contract. Therefore, where 
contractors lead, the contractor member is often a facilities 
management firm, which may be a subsidiary of a building 
contractor. The facilities manager then has an on-going interest 
in the operating phase of the project.
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As far as funders are concerned, the distinction between 
developers and contractors is blurred in practice. The developer 
accepts responsibility for the delivery of the project, which is 
then undertaken by building and/or facilities management 
contractors. Consequently the contractors are responsible if 
they do not deliver as required. To the funder, the risk of poor 
performance is passed on to the other parties in the consortium, 
regardless of their particular roles in the process.
In financial consortia the developer acts as fund manager and  
a bank as funder. However, funders are often brought in far too 
late, because funders are usually involved only after the tender 
stage, which follows the initial proposal stage.
In a delivery-plus model consortium, such as implied by PBC, 
there is a developer, a funder and a facilities manager. Together 
they form an SPV. Construction contractors are only on the 
supply chain and have a client-supplier relationship with the SPV. 
The construction side is kept at arm’s length by the SPV, although 
the SPV may insist on an open book condition in the contract 
allowing the SPV to monitor the construction phase closely.
One of the problems for lenders, and a limit on their willingness 
to form an SPV with a contractor or a developer, is that there are 
no credit ratings in the construction industry or property sector. 
The reasons for the lack of credit ratings are:
1.  Property companies’ valuations depend on the value of their 
land banks. This means their asset base is difficult to value 
and varies over time.
2.  There is no tradition of joint ventures between lenders and 
developers. There appears to be an innate conservatism on 
the part of lenders to form partnerships with developers.
3.  SPVs tend to be relatively static contractual arrangements 
whereas developers are essentially opportunistic firms 
requiring	flexibility	to	respond	to	changing	circumstances	 
and market conditions.
Construction contractors have traditionally been even more 
difficult to value than property companies. However, Standard 
and Poor (2004) have recently recognized the changes brought 
about by the PFI undertakings of contractors, which produce 
income streams. These income streams create capital values 
and form an asset base, which can be identified and associated 
with construction firms. Nevertheless, from a financial point  
of view, significant fragmentation within consortia remains 
between the financial inputs and the commercial and 
speculative functions and the industrial processes of 
constructing buildings.
In the early to mid 1990s the recession in the construction 
industry pushed firms towards working in consortia, further 
encouraged by PFI projects for the public sector. Contractors 
decided to lead consortia in order to protect their business. 
For one contractor, Bovis Lend Lease, working within a 
consortium represented an investment interest as well as 
providing construction work and facilities management.  
Winning construction work was the major driver for contractors 
in consortia because construction provided the earliest returns. 
Government also wanted operators to run the built facilities. 
However, the returns on facilities management are too long term 
and contractors were not geared to taking on long term 
investments. This is a major issue and we return to this point 
later. Nevertheless, a number of major contractors also provide 
facilities management in addition to their construction work, 
while at least one firm, Amey plc, has tended to concentrate  
on facilities management.
The current building recession, at the end of the first decade  
of the century, comes at a time when many contractors were 
showing signs of reluctance to participate in PFI projects. 
It remains to be seen what trends will emerge as a result of  
the current downturn in the construction market.
The purpose of a consortium is to meet the total needs of the 
client. In principle forming a consortium allows communication 
of clients’ needs to subcontractors, which improves client 
satisfaction. Most consortia are put together for the public 
sector or in some cases a large private sector client such as 
British Airports Authority. A consortium is usually set up in 
conjunction with an open and transparent partnering agreement. 
To achieve this, the consortium requires partners to have 
common aims and objectives. All the constituent parts should 
make up a coherent whole. Although the arrangements can be 
loose or formal, there should be a culture embodying a belief in 
the aims of the project and a belief in the other members of the 
team and the value they bring. Moreover, there are three 
elements that form or glue a consortium. They are mutual risk, 
trust and money. But these elements can also create major 
friction within consortia.
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The builder and the operator may or may not be part of an SPV 
but the client often assumes builders and operators are part of 
the consortium. The main contractor and the mechanical and 
electrical (M&E) contractor may have a good relationship, but 
the M&E is not usually part of the consortium. The M&E 
contractors, therefore, have no direct access to, or relationship 
with, the funders or financiers. The specialist firm is in the 
supply chain but not in the consortium. The client liaises with 
the SPV, which assumes responsibility for legal and financial 
aspects. The SPV then commissions a contractor for the 
construction phase and a facilities manager or operator (if 
required) during the building-in-use phase. Both the contractor 
and the operator are seen as leading their supply chains to the 
SPV. The supply chains extend to the subcontractors and 
material and component suppliers. In this model, the SPV acts 
as a client of both the contractor and the facilities manager, 
even though both may be shareholders in the SPV. The SPV 
therefore comes between the client and the supply chains, 
which actually undertake the work.
Specialist sub-contractors can, therefore, experience the same 
difficulties encountered in many construction projects whether 
they involve consortia or not. The early stages are based  
on trust with builders, but after winning a tender the main 
contractor may ask for a price reduction. In one instance, the 
interviewee was asked for a £3m reduction on an £18m tender 
and this concession was followed with very late payments by 
the main contractor. Consequently the firm, which is a 
subsidiary, is no longer allowed by its parent company to join 
consortia on the basis of trust alone. The extent of reliance on 
good faith forms part of the risk analysis of any given project.
From a legal perspective, there is no single definition of the term 
‘consortium’. A consortium may or may not be formed of like 
organizations, such as all-architect members or all-contractor 
members, and it may or may not be jointly or severally liable. 
The formation of a consortium would be unnecessary, if a client 
did not want any involvement in the construction process. 
A consortium, which is separate from the client, can lead to 
distrust. One measure to overcome this distrust is a single open 
contract for all team members. This pre-contract requirement 
would not only reduce the inherent distrust, which arises when  
a number of firms are needed to work together on construction 
projects, but it would also reduce the time spent on negotiations. 
If a client participates in the building team, the arrangement 
may be seen as conventional partnering or a consortium, which 
included the client-developer.
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6.4 Procurement issues
Standard forms for construction contracts tend to deal 
exhaustively with the obligations and rights of the partners to 
the contract. Not all of these issues are of importance regarding 
the PBC approach. The four essential issues are the following:
•	 	Specification	of	Performance:	In	traditional	construction	
contracts (general contracting) the client provides the 
contractor with the design. The contractor is being paid for 
the labour and materials necessary to construct the building 
in accordance with the design (Murdoch and Hughes 2000: 
25, 35). However, under the PBC approach the client does  
not provide the contractor with the design but with a set of 
requirements defining the functions of the projected building 
(Performance Based Specification, PBS). In this the PBC 
approach is consistent with design and build contracts.
•	 	Retained	Ownership:	In	the	PBC	approach,	the	acquisition 
of an asset is replaced by the purchase of a service. This 
must	be	reflected	in	the	contract.	In	UK	construction	projects	
the land is regularly owned by the client (Emden 2003: Part I, 
Ch. 1, Para. 36) and the materials are regularly supplied by  
the contractor (Chitty 2003: Vol. 2, Para. 37-003; Jansen 
1998: 245). In the absence of a special provision, the 
materials become the property of the employer as soon as 
they are incorporated into the building (Sims v. London Co 
[1885] 1 TLR 584; Murdoch and Hughes: 155). Given this 
context, there must be a special provision in a PBC contract 
that all the materials used by contractors remain in their 
ownership, which may be perfectly feasible under English law.
•	 	Payment:	The	payment	issue	needs	to	be	addressed	in	a	 
PBC contract. One method is a service charge whereby the 
contractor is paid over a long period of time depending on  
the performance of the building. Another is the payment of a 
lump-sum on completion before use, as in a contract for the 
supply of goods, e.g. cars. If the latter is chosen, the ability  
of the contractor to provide maintenance should be 
underpinned by a bond as a security.
•	 	Guarantees:	The	most	important	issue	concerns	the	
obligations of the contractor. Under English law, the 
contractor’s obligations are defined by three terms, which 
become part of every construction contract by implication of 
law if they are not expressly excluded. These terms, “the 
usual threefold implication” (Wilson and Rutherford 1994), are 
laid down in sections 4 (2), 4 (5) and 13 Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982. They provide that the goods supplied are 
of satisfactory quality, that the goods supplied are reasonably 
fit for the purpose and that the supplier will carry out the 
service with reasonable care and skill. The common standard 
forms such as JCT’s Standard Building Contract echo these 
obligations in their clauses. For contracts to be considered as 
PBC construction contracts another obligation must be 
included. According to that obligation the contractor 
guarantees that the completed building as a whole is fit for  
its purpose. English case law provides that such a term is 
implied in every design and build construction contract, cf. 
Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v. River Douglas Catchment 
Board [1949] 2 K.B. 500, 513; Lynch v. Thorne [1956] 1 W.L.R. 
303; Greaves & Co. Ltd v. Baynham Meikle [1975] 1 W.L.R. 
1095, 1098; National Coal Board v. Neill [1985] Q.B. 300, 317; 
see also Furst and Ramsley 2001: Para 3-58; Murdoch and 
Hughes 2000: 150. In practice, however, standard forms for 
design and build contracts exclude this implied term, cf. 
clause 2.17.1 of JCT’s Design and Build Contract 2005 (Millett 
1994: Para. 2033, with regard to the identical clause 2.5.1  
JCT Design and Build Contract 1981). Therefore, such an 
exclusion must not be expressed in a PBC contract. 
Moreover, the limitation period (indicating the spell of time  
in, which the client is able to sue the contractor for breach of 
contract) must persist for the lifetime of the building. That 
means an appropriate express term must be included in the 
contract, because the usual limitation period lasts only six 
years (section 5 Limitation Act 1980).
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07 Discussion
 t is generally assumed that the key players in construction,   
 especially in major projects, are the main or large general   
 builders or management contractors. They mobilize plant,  
 labour and materials usually by subcontracting and have 
the technical knowledge to undertake the organization of the 
construction process. It is apparent they are in a position to 
improve the production methods employed. Yet research and 
development expenditure in the construction industry lags 
behind other industries because contractors have little 
opportunity to put costly innovations into practice.
Contractors are often reported as saying they would prefer to  
be involved at an early stage in their projects, preferably before 
designs have been finalized. Otherwise, once a design has been 
selected and the construction costs estimated, it is difficult for 
contractors	to	influence	the	outcome	either	to	reduce	the	cost	
of	construction	or	influence	the	running	and	maintenance	costs	
of a building.
Because they have so little design input, it is often possible for 
contractors to externalize increases in costs due to changes  
in the design. Provided the management contractors have 
satisfied the terms of their building contracts, they cannot be 
held responsible for problems upstream in the supply chain.
In order to limit the escalation of costs PFI places responsibility 
for costs throughout the building life cycle with contractors  
and funders. As a result contractors and funders internalize the 
costs of contracting and the on-going costs of inappropriate 
building	methods	or	building	design.	In	terms	of	cash	flow	it	is	
the building that takes up most money at the beginning of most 
projects.	This	bunching	of	the	cash	flow	remains	regardless	of	
whether the payer is the public or the private sector. In common 
with	PFI	projects,	PBC	alters	the	cash	flow.	For	example,	under	
PBC specifying a building in health care in terms of infection 
rate reduction or monthly functionality of the building, and  
only making payments on fulfilment of these performance 
specifications	may	be	a	way	of	spreading	the	cash	flow	 
evenly and over a long period.
However, the high transaction costs associated with PFI and  
the higher costs of finance of private firms compared to public 
sector borrowing may only be compensated for by possible 
efficiency gains due to the incentivization created by PFI. 
However, it is by no means clear that any improvements in 
efficiency compensate for the increase in risk premium the 
public sector must pay in order to enable PFI projects to 
proceed or compensate for the public sector’s loss of direct 
control over the finished building.
I
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Discussion
The complexities of PFI mean that the private sector has a dual 
role. It is engaged to supply the public sector with buildings and 
structures and it is also expected to finance the project. This 
dual role of the private sector under the PFI has led to costly 
and often lengthy negotiations. The cost of procurement alone 
has become prohibitively high, especially for contractors, to the 
point where contractors have begun to show increasing 
reluctance to bid for projects, as pointed out earlier.
If financial issues and discussions could be separated from 
delivery, it would be possible for the transactors to focus on  
the performance of buildings and the requirements of the client. 
This would release the teams negotiating contracts from a large 
number of complications and reduce the costs of procurement 
and tendering. Naturally risks would still need to be identified  
and measured by both parties but these would be assessed by 
the purchaser quite separately from the supplier. The emphasis 
becomes one of building performance rather than the components 
and materials used in construction. This arrangement can be seen 
as an example of PBC. In PBC payments are not made during 
the construction phase. The client only pays suppliers once 
buildings are in use and payments are based on meeting 
performance requirements. 
PBC is a logical extension of PFI or Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP). Both PFI and PPP adopt a whole life cycle approach 
insofar as post construction use of buildings and structures are 
built into the contract. In PFI and PPP the finance for both the 
construction and post-construction phases are sourced in the 
private sector. If the public sector were only required to pay for a 
project over an agreed period of use once its construction is 
completed and the building is in operation, then suppliers such 
as developers and contractors would concentrate on ensuring 
the performance of buildings and structures was satisfactory. 
Using the PBC model, contractors would be able to demonstrate 
to clients how to improve the value of their projects. There are 
distinct possibilities for efficiency gains. PBC potentially offers an 
opportunity to present a new model of contracting that would 
provide incentives and innovation, restructuring of the 
construction market and improvements in productivity.
The key to improving performance is giving firms incentives 
both positive and negative. The first firms to adopt PBC would 
gain a competitive advantage and expand while those that were 
slower would lose market share. Positive incentives would need 
to motivate firms and demonstrate to their competitors in the 
construction industry that firms, which adopted PBC for at least 
some of their work, found such projects profitable. This would 
encourage others to follow. Negative incentives would be 
provided by performance penalties.
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It cannot be claimed that PBC is revolutionary in itself. Like 
most developments in construction, the concept of PBC is 
already widely in use in other industrial sectors. It is merely the 
next logical step in construction and service procurement based 
on PFI principles but without the private finance discussion 
necessary in PFI. This new mode of working is not even new  
to construction. For example, similar arrangements are in use  
in the German construction industry, and in the UK many firms 
already undertake PBC-type work when installing and servicing 
building components. 
Traditional contracts are based on the specification of client 
requirements in terms of time, cost and quality, with teams of 
experts helping clients to specify targets for each of these 
objectives. A contractor who achieves what was required will 
have fulfilled contractual obligations and will rightly expect to be 
paid, regardless of whether the client is satisfied with the result. 
Egan (1998) proposed an agenda for radical change and 
improvement in the way that the construction industry organizes 
projects. The industry was urged to replace competitive tendering 
with long term relationships based on clear measurements of 
performance and sustained improvements in quality and 
efficiency. Although there has been much work implementing 
the changes called for by Egan, very little attention has been 
paid to the contractual issues that would arise as a result of 
moving away from competitive tendering.
One radical approach would therefore be to depart from the 
traditional focus of documenting physical building elements and 
building component requirements. These are the documents 
used by contractors to compete on price. Instead, an innovative 
approach would be to specify what performance is required 
from a completed building, or sub-system, and to choose a 
contractor based upon that contractor’s past performance in 
achieving client performance requirements, and a promise of 
future performance that would form the basis of a deal that is 
negotiated. The mix between selection based on reputation and 
selection based on promises is a challenge for clients. 
We have suggested that the providers of construction services 
may be left to decide how to achieve the ends, instead of being 
instructed in great detail about what, precisely, should be built. 
This would require payment to be linked to the performance 
achieved, rather than the quantity of building work undertaken 
and materials supplied. One consequence of this approach may 
be to reduce the documentation and project management 
overhead required by clients.
Until recently, when the Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2008) 
reported on collusive tendering, the UK’s traditional focus on 
lowest price bidding appeared to have helped to avoid the worst 
excesses of collusion and corrupt practices, and there were 
naturally very real fears about losing the accountability that 
came from traditional practice. This is not to say there were no 
problems with the construction tendering process as practiced 
in the UK. If contractors’ performance data were to be made 
freely available in the public domain, then this problem would at 
least be recognized. These ideas raise some serious questions 
for research, especially following the Statement of Objections 
published by the OFT (ibid.) on collusion in the construction 
industry. The emphasis on price competition clearly did not 
prevent certain collusive practices from emerging, at least in the 
view of the OFT. 
In our study we found a lack of awareness of PBC combined 
with fears over the long term implications for FFP. Furthermore, 
the uninsurable risks arising from FFP are major obstacles to 
contractors accepting PBC. This would imply that PBC is not a 
risk that non-PFI contractors have been exploring. This is not 
surprising as few innovations in procurement methodology have 
been made other than by clients. Nevertheless, the lack of 
workload	and	the	state	of	the	market	may	influence	contractors	
to take on risks associated with PBC. 
Many existing contractors do not have sufficient resources 
and capital to undertake PBC obligations. Without sufficient 
capital they would be merely managers of the construction 
process rather than financial stakeholders and would be 
surplus to requirements.
Under PFI contracting the client accepts some risks, the 
contractor accepts others. FFP requirements are clearly stated 
in the specifications. In PBC contractors would be expected to 
accept liability for a building’s function to ensure that it matches 
the client’s FFP requirements (Ang et al., 2001; Hattis and 
Becker, 2001). One major risk identified in this study was that 
clients’ requirements may change over time (and even the 
building production phase can extend over a considerable 
period). Such changes would alter the objectives of FFP. The 
contractor would be uninsured for such changes of use, even  
if they were reasonable and negotiable, without incurring major 
additional insurance expenses. 
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In traditional construction contracts, contractors would be able 
to take advantage of changes because they would be in a 
position to negotiate a new price and extra time. Having agreed 
a fixed price for a particular service, under PBC the contractor 
may be exposed to a major risk, if the detailed definition of what 
is needed to achieve a given level of service develops or changes 
at some point in the future, unless there is an opportunity for 
renegotiation of the contract terms. In the event of such changes, 
contractors may fear they would not receive the agreed rewards  
if the client is not satisfied. Since contract enforcement through 
the courts is costly, the producer is vulnerable in a deal, which 
invariably requires considerable up-front investment from the 
supply side. The worst case scenario is:
-  the clients have a building, which has been procured for the 
original purpose but is no longer suitable
-  the producers are unable either to receive their post-
construction reward or dispose of the building profitably  
and quickly to reduce their financial exposure.
Furthermore, if the FFP changed over the longer term (during 
client occupation), contractors might fear that they would be in 
danger of not being paid the on-going rewards. This could be 
considered an unacceptable risk, even for the largest firms. 
Using innovative products (an integral part of PBC) was also 
seen as ‘risky’ as many products had not been available for 
sufficiently long periods of time to ensure their durability.  
This contradicts the innovative aspects of PBC as described  
by Poirier et al., (2004), Foliente (2000) and Bramwell, (2003). 
Although, in principle, contractors could require suppliers to 
take responsibility for individual products to perform over time 
as a prerequisite of PBC, contractors appeared to be reluctant 
to take responsibility for buildings as a whole.
In the majority of industrial production processes the producer 
is responsible for securing finance for the production process.  
If contractors found they had insufficient capital to fund 
production, under PBC the contractor/developer would be able  
to	use	the	contract	and	the	promise	of	a	future	cash	flow	as	
collateral to finance the construction phase. 
Some contractors might object that the risks of PBC are too 
great and too long term for contractors. However, it does not 
follow that contractors could not build up the expertise to 
undertake the life cycle commitments necessary for PBC. There  
is nothing necessarily insurmountable that prevents building 
producers acquiring the expertise and resources needed for 
PBC, given the will and the necessary incentives.
Like so much innovation in the construction industry the change 
may well have to be initiated on the client side. Although PBC 
may be relevant to private sector clients, the public sector 
client, acting as a good client, is in a strong position to create 
the conditions and terms necessary for contractors to accept 
PBC. Specifying performance levels and desirable outcomes, and 
measuring and monitoring them form the core of a performance-
based contract. As with any contract, both sides must be able to 
agree on their expectations for payments to be met.
Private sector firms would then compete to provide the building, 
and quality would be driven by contractors’ needs to protect 
their reputation and maintain good relations with their clients. 
Contractors would have the incentive of being considered for 
repeat business. Market principles would also shape their 
behaviour as firms competed for market share and pursued 
company-growth policies.
The introduction of PBC in the current UK construction market 
takes advantage of the cultural changes in the construction 
industry brought about by PFI, namely the increased awareness 
of post-construction considerations. It combines this change in 
public sector construction procurement with the more traditional 
methods of financing projects, without passing additional costs 
back on to the public sector or private sector client.
PBC fits in to the range of contractual arrangements operating 
in the construction sector. Indeed it is possible to conceive of  
a systematic method for defining appropriate structures for 
procuring buildings and building services including PBC. We 
propose a new innovative paradigm based on a decision tree 
method for evaluating appropriate procurement types. The 
position of PBC in relation to alternative methods of procument 
can be readily defined using only a few direct questions. These 
questions can be used to show the nature of any construction 
contract relationship, the role of the contractor and the type of 
contract used. The answers to these questions also indicate the 
reasons for different contract approaches. The resulting contract 
may be seen as a response to the circumstances of its use.  
We consider this decision tree to be of considerably wider 
significance than only determining PBC as it can be applied 
equally to establish the appropriateness of different types of 
procurement depending on a limited number of conditions.
The questions are:
1. Does the client pay for contractor’s work in progress?
2. Does ownership of the facility transfer to purchaser?
3. Does the contractor have overall responsibility for design?
4. Is the contractor responsible for managing assembly?
5. Is all of the contractor’s work sub-contracted to others? 
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Does the
client pay for
contractor’s work
in progress?
Does the
contractor have 
overall
responsibility for
design?
Yes
No
Does ownership
of the facility
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purchaser?
Yes
No
Start
Performance-based
contract
PFI
Design and build
Construction
management
General
contracting
Management
contract
Is the
contractor
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for managing
assembly?
Is all of the
contractor’s work
sub-contracted
to others?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Figure 4: Methods of Procuring Contractors’ Work 
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The answers to these questions are shown in Figure 4, which 
shows the methods for procuring contractor’s work, not the 
buildings as such. Using the questions in Figure 4 shows clearly 
that PBC occurs when the client does not pay for contractor’s 
work in progress and ownership of the facility does not transfer 
to purchaser.
As the private sector does not take on any residual risk after  
the term of a contract, it is reasonable to take over the buildings 
once the construction phase contractual arrangements have 
been completed, though this may be extended under PFI 
contracts or PBC. The reversion of the asset does not 
necessarily complicate the transaction. Indeed the purchase  
of buildings is not necessarily problematic or complicated.  
In the housing market people buy houses with the minimum  
of inspection.
There are market risks associated with PBC transactions from 
the point of view of public sector clients. PBC transactions take 
place in a market context over an extended period of time. One 
of these risks is that during the tendering and negotiating stages 
there is an element of competition but as soon as a project has 
been agreed the supplier becomes a monopolist. Moreover, 
there is a public sector duty to provide so that there can be  
no failure due to the supplier being unable to function. For 
example, safe and weather-proof school buildings are required, 
regardless of the financial problems facing a contractor. The 
reality of failure means that porta-cabins are often used as 
school rooms. If a health service project fails the costs can be 
much greater than the project. The whole health infrastructure  
of an area could be threatened with collapse.
It can be argued that PBC is no different from conventional 
outsourcing of services. If money follows the service 
requirements, there is a shift in capital requirements for health 
care from built structures to actual health provision. In the public 
sector this in turn creates an issue in terms of capital and 
revenue accounts in the Health Service. 
A further issue, arising out of the emphasis on outsourced 
services rather than buildings and direct employment, is that 
corporate commitment and long term stability are essential. 
Firms need to be prepared to undertake long term contracts. 
This does not mean that the ownership of organizations is 
immutable. Where ownership transfer takes place there is a 
requirement to protect and maintain continuity of service levels. 
Even where the same organization remains in charge, where 
there	is	fluid	staff	turnover	individual	members	of	staff	may	not	
be as motivated as much as permanently employed people.  
In fact in PFI projects the initial developer often sells on  
the	contract	and	its	cash	flow	to	provide	an	agreed	post	
construction phase service as soon as the project has  
been built, set up or is running smoothly.
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At present there is usually a split in responsibilities. For 
example, the public sector employs nurses and doctors while 
the private sector provides the buildings. The private sector may 
have different priorities in running a building. For example, the 
air	conditioning	used	to	control	temperatures	may	be	in	conflict	
with the needs of the nurses and doctors. Objective criteria and 
methods of resolving disputes are needed to arbitrate in such 
conflicts.	Political	disputes	may	arise,	for	example,	where	
hospitals are widely seen as failing to meet the requirements  
of the building users, (including cleaning, maintenance and  
the presence of MRSA and other bacterial infections), and the 
present situation may not be allowed to continue.
A distinction needs to be drawn between long term issues and 
short run requirements. In the long term built assets are not 
always appropriate for the demands placed upon them, 
because they are static, fixed and durable, whereas needs are 
dynamic and often volatile, depending on changes in numbers 
as a result of shifts of population, economic conditions and 
technology developments. The long term may need a different 
contract to that needed to meet short term requirements. 
Contradictions between long and short term requirements could 
lead to no-win situations for contractors, as they attempt to 
meet short term changes in demand by lowering maintenance 
standards with long term implications. This can often occur as 
managers within an organization act in their own personal 
interests on the assumption that succeeding managers will  
have to deal with the consequences of deteriorating under-
maintained buildings and structures.
PFI represents an alternative to traditional government 
procurement. PBC is a new challenge. PFI imposes penalties 
for non-performance, which the traditional method does not.  
PFI provides incentives to repair and maintain the asset. 
Another benefit of PFI is the discipline it brings to a project  
but its disadvantage is its complexity. PBC may offer a simpler 
alternative than PFI. It would appear that a more responsive 
approach to public sector procurement is required and the more 
flexible	the	procurement	method	the	better.	PBC	offers	a	more	
flexible	form	of	procurement	than	conventional	PFI	projects,	
which	are	highly	inflexible.
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    irms tend to accept risk only for the life of the   
    construction phase of projects, not for the life of the   
    building. The risk-decision making process is structured  
    accordingly, because contractors tend not to accept 
responsibilities (apart from those covered under the typical 
terms of retention clauses) after the construction phase, unless 
they have an on-going contract. Longer term risk obligations 
require contractors to have appropriate organizational 
structures. The difficulties of insuring and dealing with FFP  
are major obstacles to the adoption of PBC by contractors. 
Contractors prefer suppliers to assume responsibility for  
their products under PBC.
Under PBC it may be argued that contractors are given the 
freedom, responsibility and authority to perform their work as 
they see fit. However, there are many risks for the contractors. 
As the rewards of payment are delayed and repeat business 
may not materialize, taking on the additional risks of PBC could 
jeopardize the solvency of the contractors involved. Therefore, 
the question becomes one of balancing the increased risks 
against the possibility of increased rewards. Given the nature  
of the construction market it may not always be possible for 
contractors to pass on unexpected increased costs to  
their clients.
One method frequently adopted in construction is  
therefore to spread the risk by forming a syndicate  
with other firms in order to undertake projects with  
a higher risk profile than the firm would be willing 
or able to accept on its own. Nevertheless, the  
resulting consortia do not necessarily reduce  
risk. They merely spread it.
08 Conclusions
F
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We conclude that:
•	 	the	roles	and	relationships	within	consortia	are	structured	
around risk. The members of consortia share commercial and 
reputational risks but otherwise adopt traditional roles within 
consortia-type arrangements
•	 	the	main	source	of	risk	and	conflict	is	the	reliance	on	other	
members of the consortium to deliver
•	 	firms	in	the	construction	industry	tend	to	have	relatively	lower	
capital to output ratios than firms in the automotive industry. 
This implies that firms in construction have little spare 
financial capacity for working capital, long term commitments 
and contingencies. This is reinforced by the net current assets 
to turnover ratio
•	 	the	argument	frequently	given	that	firms	in	construction	
experience relatively low profit margins is not supported by 
the comparison with the automotive industry
•	 	long	term	borrowing	in	construction	tends	to	be	lower	than	
auto manufacturing and repairs implying relatively less fixed 
capital investment and longer term commitments. This is 
reinforced by the ratio of fixed assets to capital employed and 
fixed assets as a percentage of turnover
•	 	there	are	many	firms	in	the	construction	industry	whose	ratios	
may well equip them to take on PBC contracts
•	 	the	perceived	risks	of	PBC	deter	most	contractors	from	
considering PBC as an option. However, 5% of respondents 
agreed that PBC might be used for minor projects only, 
where the project represented only a small percentage  
of total output of the firm and was therefore not a threat to 
its survival
•	 	PBC	represents	a	service	innovation	if	viewed	as	an	extension	
of the provision of a product. Alternatively it may be viewed  
as the introduction of a new service. 
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Main business activity of firm and role in construction process
Personal role in construction process
Approximately how many people engaged directly by the firm
Approximate turnover of firm
1.  Do you have any long term consortium arrangements?  
(Yes/no.)
2. Why do you enter into these agreements? 
3. Under what circumstances do you form a consortium? 
4. Do you have a standard partnering agreement? (Yes/no.)
5. Which members of the consortium are responsible for 
	 •	 Financial	provision
	 •	 Design
	 •	 Actual	construction
	 •	 Management
	 •	 Financial	control
	 •	 Other	roles
6.  Are there terms and conditions you seek in the negotiations 
before entering a consortium?
7. What are the additional risks of being in a consortium?
8. What risks are reduced by the use of consortia?
9.  Which parties in a consortium should carry these  
respective risks? 
	 •	 Cost	overruns
	 •	 Late	delivery
	 •	 Design	changes
	 •	 Unresolved	disputes
	 •	 Other
10. Why should they carry these risks?
11. Who carries these respective risks at present?
12.  What difference does limited liability have on the behaviour 
of firms in consortia compared to firms outside and do you 
have any examples of firms taking advantage of their limited 
liability to avoid financial difficulties? 
13. What disputes if any have arisen? 
14. How are decisions taken? 
	 •	 Jointly	following	discussion	at	regular	meetings
	 •	 	By	one	party	(developer,	bank,	contractor,	architect,	
other decides)
	 •	 Consultation	with	all	parties	concerned
	 •	 Ad	hoc	discussion.
	 •	 Other
15.  How open are the decisions – is the client informed? (Yes/
no) If so, rough percentage.
16.  How open are the decisions – are decisions circulated in 
any form? (Yes/no.) If so how?
Appendix A: Interview questions
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1. Do you know what performance-based contracting is?
2.  Bearing in mind the definition* above, what would you 
consider to be the risks in performance-based contracting?
3. How do you deal with these risks?
4.  Which of these risks do you absorb and which do you think 
should be taken by your suppliers, yourselves or your clients?
5.  Under what circumstances (if any) would you be prepared 
to use performance-based construction?
6.  Do you require suppliers or sub-contractors to be responsible 
for their inputs beyond building completion/retention?
6a. If yes, please give an example.
7.  Do you accept responsibility for your output (building) 
beyond building completion/retention period/warranty period?
8.  If you do accept responsibility, how is this effected and 
under what circumstances?
*the definition supplied to respondents was “the building is 
procured, based on its fitness for purpose, not the method of 
construction or the building components used.”
Appendix B: Questions used in the risk assessment survey
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 Percentage of  
Circumstances respondents
Fitness for purpose (FFP) 7
Lack of insurance for FFP 6
Lifetime costs (including responsibility for lifetime maintenance)  4
Price (capital cost) 3
Inadequate client specification 3
Changing the mindset of clients, consultants, designers and contractors 2
Setting the key indicators 2
Measurements of key indicators over time 2
“Wouldn’t touch it!” 2
The “fitness for purpose” changing after completion 2
Too risky for a contractor 2
Client may not get what he perceived 1
Not truly understanding what “fitness for purpose” means 1
Delivery to a price and a programme 1
Consultants cannot get insurance 1
Type of contract 1
Type of specification  1
PBC may not promote creative design 1
Measurement of project indicators 1
Third party intervention for key indicator measurement 1
Poor communication  1
Inadequate materials 1
Inadequate staffing levels 1
Considerable rework 1
Minimum quantity 1
PBC would give minimal safety  1
Client may not like input, which contractor identifies as “fit for purpose” 1
Total 51
Table 13: Potential use of PBC
Appendix C: Risks of PBC as suggested by respondents
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D1
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 40 40 56 65 62 65 65 77 72
Median 0.285 0.308 0.259 0.218 0.229 0.241 0.265 0.219 0.247
First quartile 0.125 0.173 0.083 0.089 0.078 0.095 0.133 0.073 0.062
Third quartile 0.540 0.536 0.448 0.398 0.397 0.442 0.479 0.476 0.461
Table D1.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 197 207 267 360 401 467 543 671 760
Median 1.014 0.973 0.844 0.842 0.811 0.771 0.746 0.857 0.818
First quartile 0.473 0.536 0.403 0.354 0.333 0.298 0.3199 0.335 0.352
Third quartile 1.491 1.386 1.309 1.340 1.272 1.246 1.260 1.443 1.394
Table D1.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 37 37 53 61 61 64 64 73 67
Median 0.207 0.272 0.195 0.224 0.171 0.279 0.226 0.196 0.194
First quartile 0.082 0.083 0.047 0.061 0.055 0.073 0.070 0.069 0.077
Third quartile 0.409 0.566 0.449 0.398 0.452 0.446 0.373 0.443 0.379
Table D1.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 141 156 193 242 268 300 363 430 494
Median 0.243 0.247 0.248 0.231 0.250 0.238 0.214 0.242 0.254
First quartile 0.068 0.096 0.094 0.088 0.068 0.065 0.061 0.076 0.073
Third quartile 0.464 0.465 0.493 0.501 0.457 0.430 0.407 0.478 0.601
Table D1.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D1: Accounting ratios of firms in SIC 45.1 – site preparation 1996–2004
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 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 40 40 56 65 62 65 65 77 72
Median 0.036 0.030 0.015 0.033 0.015 0.004 0.027 0.026 0.050
First quartile -0.072 -0.089 -0.077 -0.111 -0.071 -0.077 -0.050 -0.072 -0.036
Third quartile 0.177 0.130 0.137 0.098 0.112 0.136 0.122 0.093 0.151
Table D1.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 40 40 56 65 63 65 65 77 72
Median 0.089 0.075 0.066 0.068 0.058 0.080 0.067 0.061 0.082
First quartile 0.025 -0.003 0.011 0.014 0.028 0.025 0.039 0.0238 0.032
Third quartile 0.145 0.119 0.122 0.105 0.118 0.167 0.187 0.158 0.187
Table D1.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 40 40 56 65 62 65 65 77 72
Median 3.259 3.034 3.602 3.331 4.212 3.467 3.210 3.864 3.638
First quartile 1.562 1.374 2.144 2.280 2.224 2.087 1.940 1.959 2.015
Third quartile 5.875 4.677 9.348 9.535 10.098 7.629 6.385 9.170 14.778
Table D1.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D1: Accounting ratios of firms in SIC 45.1 – site preparation (continued)
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D2
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 2759 2833 3421 3916 4039 4107 4153 4462 4427
Median 0.137 0.144 0.133 0.130 0.129 0.129 0.135 0.126 0.127
First quartile 0.047 0.053 0.046 0.039 0.044 0.043 0.043 0.036 0.037
Third quartile 0.379 0.392 0.355 0.327 0.338 0.348 0.349 0.333 0.351
Table D2.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 13078 13527 17929 22386 24438 26735 29771 35752 40587
Median 0.454 0.456 0.444 0.444 0.432 0.414 0.390 0.438 0.427
First quartile 0.118 0.123 0.106 0.105 0.104 0.099 0.090 0.095 0.092
Third quartile 0.945 0.934 0.941 0.976 0.972 0.964 0.960 1.090 1.086
Table D2.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 2517 2595 3088 3477 3611 3636 3642 3869 3767
Median 0.063 0.066 0.062 0.060 0.060 0.057 0.054 0.058 0.055
First quartile 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.019 0.018  0.019
Third quartile 0.182 0.192 0.176 0.167 0.165 0.160 0.159 0.159 0.159
Table D2.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 8237 8519 10248 11897 12722 13797 15893 18702 20973
Median 0.174 0.162 0.170 0.169 0.160 0.149 0.128 0.134 0.136
First quartile 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.033 0.028 0.022 0.020 0.019
Third quartile 0.472 0.449 0.474 0.494 0.490 0.474 0.453 0.507 0.516
Table D2.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D2: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 45.2 – building of complete constructions or parts thereof: civil engineering, 1996–2004
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 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 2758 2832 3420 3916 4040 4105 4153 4462 4427
Median 0.046 0.052 0.047 0.043 0.048 0.051 0.055 0.048  0.050
First quartile -0.019 -0.013 -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 -0.012 -0.008 -0.016 -0.016
Third quartile 0.174 0.187 0.168 0.158 0.166 0.176 0.182 0.179 0.193
Table D2.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 2753 2819 3403 3895 4011 4080 4116 4430 4388
Median 0.037 0.042 0.0469 0.0497 0.049 0.057 0.057 0.065  0.075
First quartile 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.016
Third quartile 0.096 0.105 0.125 0.142 0.155 0.163 0.174 0.209 0.236
Table D2.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 6779 6886 8682 10491 11027 11622 12398 13718 14078
Median 0.183 0.203 0.230 0.261 0.268 0.299 0.324 0.383 0.445
First quartile 0.026 0.035 0.037 0.042 0.047 0.056 0.064 0.072 0.080
Third quartile 0.528 0.545 0.690 0.869 0.903 0.992 1.022 1.236 1.407
Table D2.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D2: Accounting ratios of firms in SIC 45.2 – building of complete constructions or parts thereof:  
civil engineering (continued)
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D3
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 565 626 866 1135 1256 1302 1367 1572 1705
Median 0.104 0.114 0.111 0.109 0.104 0.113 0.106 0.095 0.101
First quartile 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.042 0.041 0.036 0.031 0.027 0.029
Third quartile 0.210 0.236 0.237 0.216 0.218 0.221 0.209 0.202 0.211
Table D3.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 3506 3633 5335 7593 8776 10155 12037 16828 21070
Median 0.469 0.466 0.457 0.464 0.439 0.421 0.424 0.537 0.538
First quartile 0.207 0.212 0.183 0.168 0.155 0.144 0.140 0.163 0.158
Third quartile 0.897 0.873 0.908 0.967 0.964 0.951 1.002 1.537 1.417
Table D3.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 542 596 816 1051 1166 1207 1251 1444 1555
Median 0.050 0.055 0.052 0.056 0.052 0.049 0.050 0.053 0.057
First quartile 0.023 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.022
Third quartile 0.104 0.111 0.111 0.115 0.100 0.103 0.112 0.118 0.124
Table D3.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 2258 2355 3055 3936 4421 5018 6136 8109 10018
Median 0.141 0.136 0.144 0.148 0.141 0.129 0.116 0.132 0.134
First quartile 0.036 0.035 0.033 0.034 0.030 0.025 0.022 0.021 0.020
Third quartile 0.375 0.364 0.396 0.429 0.431 0.425 0.409 0.516 0.514
Table D3.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D3: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 45.3 – building installation, 1996–2004
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D3
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 565 626 865 1135 1256 1302 1367 1571 1705
Median 0.045 0.047 0.047 0.042 0.046 0.051 0.045 0.036 0.030
First quartile -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.015 -0.013 -0.012 -0.018 -0.036 -0.041
Third quartile 0.115 0.132 0.123 0.128 0.133 0.139 0.133 0.123 0.121
Table D3.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 564 625 865 1133 1250 1298 1360 1571 1702
Median 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.050 0.061 0.060 0.065 0.088  0.113
First quartile 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.023 0.029
Third quartile 0.085 0.091 0.121 0.138 0.159 0.169 0.194 0.243 0.287
Table D3.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1406 1433 2108 2968 3332 3717 4143 5214 5807
Median 0.315 0.305 0.405 0.509 0.553 0.595 0.632 0.962 1.000
First quartile 0.091 0.106 0.113 0.148 0.140 0.151 0.143 0.203 0.249
Third quartile 0.790 0.739 1.089 1.409 1.416 1.554 1.649 3.226 2.736
Table D3.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D3: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 45.3 – building installation (continued)
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D4
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 360 388 528 711 796 839 916 1151 1290
Median 0.108 0.104 0.097 0.098 0.087 0.101 0.098 0.077 0.095
First quartile 0.039 0.043 0.028 0.018 0.018 0.024 0.025 0.010 0.020
Third quartile 0.215 0.229 0.221 0.208 0.207 0.218 0.217 0.197 0.220
Table D4.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 2270 2340 3473 4958 5834 6833 8462 12912 16712
Median 0.555 0.532 0.523 0.477 0.468 0.450 0.457 0.608 0.605
First quartile 0.243 0.218 0.189 0.159 0.145 0.137 0.132 0.168 0.161
Third quartile 0.997 0.969 0.999 1.008 1.035 1.025 1.092 1.810 1.623
Table D4.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 344 372 480 634 710 748 809 1018 1136
Median 0.056 0.051 0.055 0.057 0.053 0.057 0.054 0.054 0.059
First quartile 0.028 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.022 0.023
Third quartile 0.129 0.137 0.130 0.118 0.122 0.134 0.120 0.143 0.152
Table D4.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1520 1542 2083 2605 3004 3447 4301 5883 7336
Median 0.187 0.168 0.182 0.172 0.166 0.159 0.136 0.159 0.158
First quartile 0.049 0.047 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.032 0.023 0.023 0.022
Third quartile 0.464 0.411 0.456 0.456 0.492 0.471 0.486 0.611 0.601
Table D4.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D4: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 45.4 – building completion, 1996–2004
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D4
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 360 388 528 711 796 839 916 1151 1290
Median 0.024 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.027 0.030 0.033 0.016 0.023
First quartile -0.023 -0.015 -0.024 -0.032 -0.038 -0.035 -0.029 -0.051 -0.042
Third quartile 0.089 0.096 0.110 0.116 0.107 0.113 0.120 0.103 0.112
Table D4.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 360 387 527 709 793 837 912 1150 1288
Median 0.030 0.038 0.050 0.060 0.060 0.068 0.080 0.107 0.137
First quartile 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.022 0.029 0.034
Third quartile 0.073 0.078 0.120 0.167 0.176 0.183 0.207 0.275 0.319
Table D4.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 931 964 1410 1948 2284 2536 2950 4076 4794
Median 0.276 0.321 0.391 0.476 0.549 0.606 0.722 1.001 1.037
First quartile 0.062 0.098 0.109 0.099 0.131 0.139 0.164 0.234 0.291
Third quartile 0.731 0.729 1.032 1.271 1.428 1.520 1.957 3.808 3.535
Table D4.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D4: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 45.4 – building completion (continued)
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D5
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 140 147 168 184 183 188 184 177 159
Median 0.482 0.590 0.628 0.547 0.523 0.535 0.538 0.543 0.506
First quartile 0.262 0.296 0.267 0.293 0.240 0.252 0.229 0.220 0.239
Third quartile 0.837 0.952 0.891 0.849 0.833 0.858 0.831 0.900 0.851
Table D5.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 827 848 995 1133 1194 1240 1288 1437 1533
Median 1.100 1.075 1.042 1.045 1.025 1.008 1.002 1.021 1.000
First quartile 0.755 0.752 0.698 0.653 0.648 0.620 0.611 0.605 0.590
Third quartile 1.433 1.359 1.368 1.393 1.376 1.351 1.383 1.436 1.391
Table D5.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 136 144 164 178 177 183 179 173 152
Median 0.644 0.700 0.718 0.683 0.606 0.585 0.555 0.591 0.630
First quartile 0.276 0.327 0.345 0.379 0.312 0.297 0.244 0.291 0.342
Third quartile 0.984 1.168 1.029 1.050 0.989 0.954 0.925 1.040 1.017
Table D5.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 665 690 777 878 887 945 1009 1108 1183
Median 0.256 0.274 0.287 0.283 0.287 0.289 0.270 0.301 0.300
First quartile 0.108 0.100 0.105 0.112 0.108 0.108 0.095 0.091 0.097
Third quartile 0.520 0.506 0.503 0.525 0.538 0.553 0.539 0.547 0.562
Table D5.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D5: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 45.5 – renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator, 1996–2004
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D5
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 140 147 168 184 183 188 184 177 159
Median -0.073 -0.048 -0.064 -0.109 -0.064 -0.069 -0.032 -0.087 -0.065
First quartile -0.243 -0.284 -0.236 -0.274 -0.251 -0.278 -0.214 -0.324 -0.280
Third quartile 0.067 0.085 0.087 0.042 0.075 0.092 0.127 0.070 0.122
Table D5.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 140 147 168 184 183 188 184 177 159
Median 0.079 0.083 0.096 0.070 0.065 0.086 0.090 0.080 0.103
First quartile 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.018 0.010 0.035 0.042 0.030 0.031
Third quartile 0.142 0.154 0.163 0.152 0.133 0.166 0.171 0.181 0.186
Table D5.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 349 346 417 471 477 471 488 496 457
Median 0.143 0.150 0.176 0.146 0.132 0.158 0.157 0.140 0.168
First quartile 0.062 0.071 0.079 0.059 0.028 0.063 0.051 0.052 0.053
Third quartile 0.296 0.301 0.317 0.325 0.282 0.323 0.306 0.372 0.364
Table D5.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D5: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 45.5 – renting of construction or demolition equipment with operator (continued)
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D6
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1618 1695 1855 2044 2101 2131 2195 2348 2303
Median 0.126 0.121 0.123 0.121 0.118 0.113 0.112 0.104 0.101
First quartile 0.063 0.059 0.057 0.052 0.051 0.045 0.044 0.037 0.035
Third quartile 0.246 0.243 0.248 0.251 0.250 0.243 0.241 0.227 0.222
Table D6.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 6799 7036 8438 10001 10921 11847 13039 15929 18283
Median 0.686 0.655 0.641 0.618 0.609 0.577 0.565 0.622 0.612
First quartile 0.271 0.260 0.227 0.193 0.174 0.151 0.135 0.142 0.132
Third quartile 1.094 1.063 1.066 1.074 1.085 1.071 1.085 1.245 1.242
Table D6.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1581 1652 1805 1970 2015 2049 2101 2233 2173
Median 0.086 0.081 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.077 0.075 0.074 0.072
First quartile 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.022
Third quartile 0.181 0.175 0.178 0.182 0.182 0.176 0.164 0.174 0.175
Table D6.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 4930 5066 5733 6429 6680 7098 7944 9175 10159
Median 0.227 0.225 0.234 0.240 0.237 0.215 0.190 0.200 0.196
First quartile 0.047 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.041 0.033 0.025 0.024 0.022
Third quartile 0.525 0.502 0.518 0.544 0.551 0.543 0.540 0.588 0.595
Table D6.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D6: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 50 – sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles;  
retail sale of automotive fuel, 1996–2004
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D6
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1618 1695 1855 2042 2101 2131 2195 2347 2303
Median 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.017 0.018
First quartile -0.014 -0.011 -0.015 -0.019 -0.025 -0.022 -0.021 -0.026 -0.030
Third quartile 0.080 0.083 0.085 0.086 0.093 0.089 0.092 0.085 0.087
Table D6.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1619 1693 1853 2041 2098 2130 2192 2346 2300
Median 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.022
First quartile 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006
Third quartile 0.045 0.045 0.047 0.044 0.045 0.048 0.053 0.064 0.067
Table D6.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 3642 3706 4167 4655 4970 5197 5488 5978 6014
Median 0.162 0.177 0.174 0.157 0.150 0.180 0.185 0.217 0.235
First quartile 0.066 0.074 0.067 0.052 0.034 0.057 0.055 0.066 0.061
Third quartile 0.342 0.361 0.372 0.380 0.413 0.449 0.493 0.748 0.902
Table D6.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D6: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 50 – sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles;  
retail sale of automotive fuel (continued)
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D7
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 172 181 202 221 230 242 241 250 235
Median 0.359 0.413 0.410 0.385 0.378 0.322 0.331 0.290 0.309
First quartile 0.171 0.174 0.156 0.169 0.139 0.114 0.090 0.100 0.101
Third quartile 0.686 0.690 0.781 0.893 0.953 0.858 0.937 0.720 0.734
Table D7.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 408 430 532 656 704 755 831 898 982
Median 0.666 0.699 0.678 0.682 0.668 0.620 0.602 0.572 0.532
First quartile 0.346 0.380 0.346 0.295 0.267 0.218 0.201 0.176 0.109
Third quartile 0.983 1.000 1.034 1.051 1.119 1.112 1.050 1.031 1.002
Table D7.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 169 179 197 216 223 234 229 240 225
Median 0.277 0.318 0.358 0.367 0.332 0.345 0.339 0.240 0.233
First quartile 0.113 0.135 0.148 0.132 0.130 0.116 0.117 0.089 0.080
Third quartile 0.552 0.654 0.773 0.850 0.780 0.786 0.802 0.697 0.573
Table D7.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 320 334 398 464 484 517 569 607 620
Median 0.214 0.219 0.212 0.234 0.211 0.211 0.185 0.200 0.186
First quartile 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.049 0.041 0.037 0.041 0.036 0.027
Third quartile 0.486 0.479 0.489 0.565 0.583 0.648 0.622 0.643 0.587
Table D7.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D7: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 34 – manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, 1996–2004
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D7
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 172 181 202 221 230 242 240 250 235
Median 0.071 0.073 0.051 0.066 0.039 0.029 0.064 0.048 0.065
First quartile -0.037 -0.022 -0.095 -0.086 -0.113 -0.160 -0.113 -0.069 -0.048
Third quartile 0.203 0.196 0.175 0.216 0.284 0.247 0.342 0.298 0.297
Table D7.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 172 181 202 221 230 242 241 250 235
Median 0.058 0.053 0.048 0.038 0.029 0.022 0.026 0.030 0.036
First quartile 0.009 0.017 -0.032 -0.028 -0.083 -0.062 -0.043 -0.020 -0.024
Third quartile 0.121 0.110 0.108 0.095 0.115 0.102 0.093 0.093 0.109
Table D7.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 283 290 355 417 441 455 483 496 469
Median 0.185 0.163 0.169 0.135 0.122 0.099 0.112 0.107 0.133
First quartile 0.061 0.038 0.003 0.010 -0.032 -0.053 -0.020 -0.027 -0.015
Third quartile 0.381 0.351 0.343 0.345 0.378 0.361 0.361 0.389 0.479
Table D7.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D7: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 34 – manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (continued)
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D8
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1789 1875 2055 2264 2329 2372 2434 2598 2538
Median 0.135 0.134 0.131 0.131 0.128 0.121 0.118 0.112 0.108
First quartile 0.066 0.063 0.059 0.056 0.053 0.048 0.047 0.041 0.037
Third quartile 0.280 0.278 0.289 0.297 0.298 0.284 0.280 0.257 0.252
Table D8.1: Capital employed over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 7197 7455 8953 10633 11599 12575 13842 16795 19232
Median 0.685 0.657 0.643 0.624 0.614 0.580 0.567 0.620 0.607
First quartile 0.275 0.265 0.233 0.199 0.179 0.155 0.138 0.144 0.132
Third quartile 1.089 1.060 1.065 1.073 1.089 1.073 1.084 1.231 1.227
Table D8.2: Fixed assets over capital employed
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1749 1830 2000 2185 2236 2282 2329 2473 2398
Median 0.097 0.091 0.096 0.094 0.096 0.086 0.083 0.081 0.079
First quartile 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.030 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.024
Third quartile 0.209 0.208 0.218 0.219 0.217 0.208 0.196 0.201 0.198
Table D8.3: Fixed assets over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 5242 5392 6119 6876 7148 7596 8492 9763 10759
Median 0.226 0.225 0.232 0.240 0.235 0.215 0.190 0.201 0.196
First quartile 0.047 0.046 0.044 0.045 0.041 0.034 0.026 0.025 0.022
Third quartile 0.523 0.502 0.516 0.545 0.552 0.548 0.545 0.591 0.595
Table D8.4: Gearing, defined as long term liabilities over fixed assets and current assets less current liabilities
Table D8: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 34 and SIC 50 combined – manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and  
semi-trailers and sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel, 1996–2004 
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Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D8
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1789 1875 2055 2262 2329 2372 2433 2597 2538
Median 0.025 0.027 0.024 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.019
First quartile -0.014 -0.012 -0.017 -0.021 -0.028 -0.026 -0.024 -0.029 -0.032
Third quartile 0.087 0.094 0.093 0.098 0.100 0.098 0.104 0.093 0.095
Table D8.5: Net current assets to turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 1790 1873 2053 2261 2326 2371 2431 2596 2535
Median 0.022 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.023
First quartile 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005
Third quartile 0.050 0.052 0.052 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.057 0.067 0.071
Table D8.6: Profit margin, defined as earnings before interest and tax over turnover
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of firms 3922 3992 4516 5068 5402 5644 5962 6465 6478
Median 0.164 0.177 0.174 0.156 0.147 0.174 0.179 0.210 0.228
First quartile 0.066 0.072 0.064 0.049 0.029 0.050 0.049 0.059 0.057
Third quartile 0.345 0.361 0.371 0.378 0.411 0.442 0.480 0.719 0.853
Table D8.7: Return on capital employed, defined as earnings before interest and tax over fixed assets and current assets  
less current liabilities
Table D8: Accounting ratios for firms in SIC 34 and SIC 50 combined – manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and  
semi-trailers and sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel (continued)
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SIC 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
451 .062 .247 .461
452 .037 .127 .351
453 .029 .101 .211
454 .020 .095 .220
455 .239 .506 .851
34 .101 .309 .734
50 .035 .101 .222
34 and 50 .037 .108 .252
Capital employed over turnover 2004
SIC 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
451 .352 .818 1.394
452 .092 .427 1.086
453 .158 .538 1.417
454 .161 .605 1.623
455 .590 1.000 1.391
34 .109 .532 1.002
50 .132 .612 1.242
34 and 50 .132 .607 1.227
Fixed assets over capital employed 2004
SIC 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
451 .077 .194 .379
452 .019 .055 .159
453 .022 .057 .124
454 .023 .059 .152
455 .342 .630 1.017
34 .080 .233 .573
50 .022 .072 .175
34 and 50 .024 .079 .198
Fixed assets over turnover 2004
SIC 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
451 .073 .254 .601
452 .019 .136 .516
453 .020 .134 .514
454 .022 .158 .601
455 .097 .300 .562
34 .027 .186 .587
50 .022 .196 .595
34 and 50 .022 .196 .595
Gearing 2004
Table D8: Summary tables 2004
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SIC 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
451 -.036 .050 .151
452 -.016 .050 .193
453 -.041 .030 .121
454 -.042 .023 .112
455 -.280 -.065 .122
34 -.048 .065 .297
50 -.030 .018 .087
34 and 50 -.032 .019 .095
Net current assets over turnover 2004
SIC 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
451 .032 .082 .187
452 .016 .075 .236
453 .029 .113 .287
454 .034 .137 .319
455 .031 .103 .186
34 -.024 .036 .109
50 .006 .022 .067
34 and 50 .005 .023 .071
Profit margin 2004
SIC 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile
451 2.015 3.638 14.778
452 .080 .445 1.407
453 .249 1.000 2.736
454 .291 1.037 3.535
455 .053 .168 .364
34 -.015 .133 .479
50 .061 .235 .902
34 and 50 .057 .228 .853
Return on capital employed 2004
Appendix D: Accounting ratios – D8
Table D8: Summary tables 2004 (continued)
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